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Banks have been at the centre of the financial crisis since 2008. Thus the European 
Commission introduced proposals to change the behaviour of European banks. In July 
2011 the Commission decided to translate the Basel III regulation to form a new 
directive in Europe, CRD IV. As part of this the European Banking Authority 
published on 8th December the formal recommendation related to banks’ 
recapitalisation needs. The banks in the sample were required to strengthen their 
capital positions and meet the target of 9% Core Tier 1 capital ratio.  
 
The main purpose of this research is to present the current capital positioning of Eu-
ropean banks and analyse the development under the Basel regulations.  
 
This research presents the development of the Basel Committee’s regulations and the 
Committee’s “from the one-size fits-all to a tailor-made approach” mind-set behind 
the development. The objective was also to analyse the requirements and the results of 
EBA’s capital exercise. Therefore deeper analysis was performed on risk-weighted 
assets as a part of the actions required in the capital exercise and also on the impacts of 
Basel III.  
 
During six months information was collected through qualitative research.The theory 
was based on relevant academic publications. Quantitative data was acquired from the 
EBA’s and IMF’s reports. A couple of bank and financial authority representatives 
were also interviewed to provide a deeper analysis and to support the quantitative data.  
 
The findings indicated that Basel III will have a clear impact on declining the capital 
ratios. Also, almost all the banks in the sample of the EBA’s capital exercise achieved 
the required target with a few exceptions. The Finnish banks proved to be on a sound 
basis with a slight advantage due to the current market situation. It was also indicated 
that with some exceptions European banks are quite wealthy and have a good capital 
adequacy situation. Hence, this will not be a problem when the implementation of new 
regulations begins. 
Keywords 
Basel frameworks, Basel III, Risk-weighted assets (RWA), Capital exercise, Core Tier 1, 
European Banking Authority (EBA). 
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1 Introduction 
Since 2007 the financial crisis has revealed a number of important weaknesses in bank-
ing regulation. In June 2011 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision published the 
newest version of Basel III framework. At the same time European Banking Authority 
conducted an EU-wide stress test. During the past year the European Union has been 
developing a new directive and act that would comply with the Basel III framework. 
 
While recovering from the global financial crisis the strengthening of capital ratios is 
one of the key priorities while restoring the confidence on the banking sector. Europe-
an Banking Authority announced at the end of 2011 the recommendation that required 
banks to achieve certain capital adequacy requirements. This was an act from the Au-
thority to prepare the banks for the future regulation. They also tried to increase the 
stability of the financial markets. 
 
1.1 Objectives of research 
The main purpose of this research is to analyse the current capital positioning of Eu-
ropean banks and the development under the Basel regulations. 
 
The primary objective is to analyse the situation of the European banking sector. This 
is done by analysing the European Banking Authority’s recommendation, capital exer-
cise and its preliminary results. Also the deeper analysis of actions taken by three case 
study banks was performed. Through these banks and some financial authority’s views 
the Finnish and European financial markets are compared on the capital adequacy mat-
ter.  
 
The secondary objective is to introduce the regulations of Basel Committee in a simple 
understandable way in order to increase the understanding why the certain regulations 
are developed and why they are aimed to develop the banking sector to chosen direc-
tion. This all stems from the Basel Committee’s “from the one-size fits-all to a tailor-
made approach” mind-set. Also the impacts of Basel III are analysed through case 
study banks and based on the static balance sheet assumptions. 
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The third objective is to perform a deeper analysis of risk-weighted assets as they are 
an important element of risk-based capital. The report concentrates on the develop-
ment of risk-weighted assets’ regulations and the role of risk-weighted assets in the 
banks’ actions to achieve EBA’s recommendation. 
 
The data for this research was collected mainly by using existing data from the academ-
ic publications. Quantitative data was supported with the structured interviews of rep-
resentatives from a case study bank and a financial authority. The interviews consisted 
of open-ended questions. The objective of using these methods was to combine and 
find new view points from existing data, and by supporting it with the interviews to 
create a comprehensive package of capital positioning of European banks. 
 
1.2 The commissioning company and benefits 
The commissioning company for this study is the Federation of Finnish Financial Ser-
vices. They represent financial companies and their objective is to secure the operating 
environment of those companies and a well-functioning financial market in general. 
The Federation is actively involved in European lobbying and they promote the inter-
ests of the financial industry. (Federation of Finnish Financial Services 2012.) 
 
This research aims to provide benefits for students and for the Federation. The Feder-
ation benefits from the research by gaining knowledge of European bank’s positioning 
through analyse of the results. This research is a part of a theme group organised by 
the commissioning party. The theme group’s objective is to compare the Finnish and 
the European financial markets. As part of the theme group this study’s input benefits 
the whole group. From the studies on the theme group a publication is combined and 
provided to financial specialists on the presentation seminar in December 2012. 
 
With this paper financial students can increase their knowledge of current regulation 
on the banking sector and the current situation of the European financial sector. 
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1.3 Structure of the research 
The research is structured by using zipper model. As the concepts are wide, the analy-
sis and conclusions are presented after the each wider concept. 
 
The thesis starts with the introduction to the subject and to the objectives of this study. 
In this part is also presented the commissioning company and the key concepts of the 
study. After this the data collection and analysis methods are presented. 
 
From chapter three onwards is presented the development of the Basel regulations and 
the impact analysis of the Basel III. These chapters contain a comprehensive package 
of the capital requirements set in the Basel regulations. Secondly is conducted a deeper 
analysis of risk-weighted assets, which are important factor in capital ratios and devel-
oped in the Basel regulations. Also the main findings of RWA are presented in chapter 
6.  
 
Thirdly is presented the European Banking Authority’s recommendation and the capi-
tal exercise’s preliminary results. After the results is shown the deeper analysis of case 
companies on this matter and also the results of the interviews in order to create the 
comparison of European and Finnish financial markets. Lastly is discussed the findings 
and validity of the results. Also the further recommendations are presented in the last 
chapter. The overlay matrix is presented in the Attachment 9. 
 
1.4 Key concepts 
Here is introduced the definitions of the key concepts of the research. The listed terms 
are essential to understand the studied phenomenon and analysed theories.  
 
Basel Committee: provides a forum for cooperation between its member countries 
on banking supervisory matters. The wider objective of the Committee has been to 
improve supervisory understanding and the quality of banking supervision by develop-
ing regulations. (Bank for International Settlements 2009, 1.) 
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2011 EU Capital exercise: The European Banking Authority published on the rec-
ommendation related to banks’ recapitalisation needs. These measures are part of 
broader package to restore stability and confidence in the markets in the EU. The na-
tional supervisory authorities were required to demand banks to strengthen their capi-
tal positions by establishing an exceptional and temporary buffer by the end of June 
2012. (European Banking Authority 2011a, 1-3.) 
 
Core Tier 1 ratio: A ratio that compares the amount of Core Tier 1 capital to amount 
of Risk-weighted assets. It represents the capital adequacy of the bank. “Core Tier 1 
Ratio = Core Tier 1 capital/RWA.” (European Banking Authority 2011b, 10.) 
 
Core Tier 1 capital: A combination of the highest quality capital instruments (retained 
earnings, issued shares) and instruments provided by governments. The definition is 
based on existing EU legislation in the Capital Requirements Directive which had been 
developed based on Basel III. (European Banking Authority 2011b, 9) 
 
Risk-weighted assets: The guidelines established a credit risk-weight for all assets. 
The amount of risk-weighted assets is the book value of the asset is multiplied by the 
credit risk-weight. The credit risks were divided under classifications that carry differ-
ent risk weights. (Fabozzi & Modi-gliani 2009, 51.) 
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2 Methodological approach 
This chapter covers the data collection and analysis processes and explains the reason-
ing why specific existing data was chosen and why certain people were interviewed. 
Both quantitative and qualitative data was collected and existing data was supported 
with structured interviews of representatives of a case study bank and a financial au-
thority. 
 
2.1 Data collection 
Data sources for this research were very limited. The existing up-to date data was pro-
vided only by international institutions and organisations that develop and analyse the 
data reported by banks. Thus literature was not that much use. The data chosen - pub-
lications, news articles and banks reports and press releases – was highly reliable and 
analysed based on its relevancy. 
 
2.1.1 Existing data 
The data for the theory framework was collected from publications of Bank of Interna-
tional Settlements, European Banking Authority and International Monetary Fund. 
These institutions are the ones that develop the regulations, organise capital exercises 
or analyse the impacts of regulations and exercises. As they operate both as developers 
and implementers, they are the only ones that have published data that is relevant to 
this study. They also have the latest and the most reliable information on the key con-
cepts. It was ensured during the data collection process that all data was relevant to the 
demarcation of research. 
 
To support this data and as the empirical part of the research three case companies 
were analysed. The relevant information connected to the objectives was collected 
from press releases, publications and highly reliable news sources such as Financial 
Times and Bloomberg. The banks’ own data is most reliable as they have the obligation 
to publish transparent data due to current regulation. 
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2.1.2 Interviews 
To support existing data found on the case companies and to get a supervisory aspect 
was organised two structured interviews. For the deeper case company analysis was 
interviewed Mikko Laukka, who is the First Vice President of Regulatory & Economic 
Capital unit on Danske Group. His area of expertise touches exactly on the most rele-
vant topics of this research. This interview gave an insight to Danske Groups opera-
tions during the capital exercise and to the actions that they take on the process of 
preparation to regulation. 
 
Also two analysts of Finnish Supervisory Authority were interviewed to get an over-
view aspect of the European banking sector. Their responsibilities include regulations 
and the European financial markets. Thanks to this interview an overview of current 
capital positioning of European banks was gained. 
 
All these interviewees were chosen on the basis that their responsibilities were highly 
relevant to the study. The interviews were planned and organised after all the other 
data was collected and analysed in order to get the most relevant additional data to the 
research. The interviews were based on open ended questions so that respondents 
were able to answer thoroughly as they wished. Therefore, the most relevant additional 
data was achieved through interviews. 
 
2.2 Data analysis 
The objective of this research was to create a comprehensive package of capital regula-
tions of the banking sector by combining existing data about the Basel frameworks. As 
the available data was very limited only the highly relevant one was taken into this re-
search and the other parts of regulations were left out. 
 
The capital exercise process and preliminary results are also presented by only one sin-
gle authority. The analysis was once again based on only the most relevant data related 
to the theory and the objectives of this study. 
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The case companies were chosen by analysing the data that is mentioned in the previ-
ous paragraph. The goal was to get the best comparison possible. One of them was 
above the required target of capital adequacy even before the capital exercise and was 
operating well on the sector. The other two banks had some capital shortfall and need-
ed to take actions to achieve the set targets. Thus it was possible to compare a bank 
that is doing well and the banks that had some issues. This analysis was also supported 
by an interview. 
 
The aim was also to get an overview of the whole banking sector in Europe and the 
interview of the supervisory authority was planned and analysed on this basis. 
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3 History of  the Basel Committee 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was established by the central-bank 
governors at the end of 1974. This was due to serious failures in international currency 
and banking markets e.g. the failure of Bankhaus Herstatt in Germany. The Committee 
has held meeting regularly three or four times a year since February 1975. (Bank for 
International Settlements 2009, 1.) 
 
The Committee's members are from Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, 
China, France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Lux-
embourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. Each 
country is represented by its central bank except when the formal responsibility is car-
ried by some other authority, in which case the authority is the representative. The cur-
rent Chairman of the Committee is Mr. Nout Wellink, President of the Netherland’s 
Bank. (Bank for International Settlements 2009, 1.) 
 
The Committee does not operate as supranational supervisory authority but it provides 
a forum for cooperation between its member countries on banking supervisory mat-
ters. The wider objective of the Committee has been to improve supervisory under-
standing and the quality of banking supervision worldwide in three principal ways ac-
cording to the Bank for International Settlements (2009, 1.): 
 
- Exchanging information on national supervisory arrangements 
- Improving the effectiveness of techniques for supervising international banking 
business 
- Setting minimum supervisory standards in areas where they are considered desirable. 
 
The Committee’s conclusions do not have any legal force but its goal is to create broad 
supervisory guidelines, standards and recommendations of best practices. They expect 
that countries will take steps to implement them through detailed arrangements which 
suit best for their national system. The Committee encourages common practices and 
common standards but they do not try to create harmonised detailed supervisory tech-
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niques among member countries. The Committee’s objective is that there is not any 
foreign banking institution that could escape supervision and that the supervision has 
to be adequate. (Bank for International Settlements 2009, 1-2.) 
 
As a result of continuous collaboration in the supervision of international banks, the 
Committee has collected information examining the obstacles to effective supervision 
arising from bank secrecy regulations. It has also studied authorisation procedures for 
new foreign banking establishments. During its history the Committee has devoted 
most of its time to capital adequacy. In the early 1980s, the Committee became con-
cerned about the deteriorating capital ratios of the main international banks and the 
growing risks. The Committee members decided to prevent the erosion of capital 
standards in their banking systems and work towards similar capital adequacy 
measures. The result was a broad consensus on measurement of the risks on a 
weighted approach, both on and off the balance sheet. (Bank for International Settle-
ments 2009, 2.) 
 
The Committee recognised the overriding need for a multinational accord to strength-
en the stability of the international banking system and to remove a source of competi-
tive inequality arising from differences in national capital requirements. This has leaded 
the Committee to publish consultative papers such as Basel Capital Accord (the 1988 
Accord) and Basel II framework. Basel III framework is under implementation proce-
dure and will be discussed in this research. This paper presents also the main features 
of Basel Capital Accord and Basel II framework. The main focus is on these consulta-
tive papers’ capital requirements. (Bank for International Settlements 2009, 2.) 
 
3.1 Basel Capital Accord 
In July 1988 the Basel Committee published their first consultative paper “Internation-
al Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards”. It was the outcome of 
the Committee’s work over several years to secure the international convergence of 
supervisory regulations governing the capital adequacy of international banks. The 
framework sets out the details for measuring capital adequacy and the minimum stand-
ard to be achieved. The framework and standard were accepted by the Group of Ten’s 
central bank Governors. (Bank for International Settlements 1988, 1.) 
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The main objective of this new framework was to strengthen the soundness and stabil-
ity of the international banking system. The capital adequacy as measured by this 
framework should have been taken into account when assessing the strength of banks. 
The framework mainly assesses capital in relation to credit risk but also interest rate 
risk and the investment risk on securities need to be taken into account by supervisors 
in overall capital adequacy assessment. (Bank for International Settlements 1988, 1-2.) 
 
This framework intended to be applied to banks on a consolidated basis taking into 
consideration subsidiaries undertaking banking and financial business. The document 
describes in its four sections the constituents of capital, risk-weighting system, the tar-
get standard ratio and transnational and implementation arrangements. (Bank for In-
ternational Settlements 1988, 3.) 
 
3.2 The constituents of capital 
The Committee considered that the key elements of capital were equity capital and dis-
closed reserves but it also considered that there were a number of other important 
components of a bank’s capital base. Therefore it was concluded that capital was de-
fined in two Tiers. At least 50% of a bank’s capital base was supposed to consist of 
core elements of equity capital and published reserves (Tier 1) and the other elements 
of capital were admitted into supplementary capital (Tier 2). (Bank for International 
Settlements 1988, 3-4.) 
 
Capital elements on this framework were thus divided into two categories: 
 Tier 1 
a)  Paid-up share capital/common stock 
b)  Disclosed reserves 
 Tier 2 
a)  Undisclosed reserves 
b)  Asset revaluation reserves 
c)  General provisions/general loan-loss reserves 
d)  Hybrid (debt/equity) capital instruments 
e)  Subordinated debt (Bank for International Settlements 1988, 17). 
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The sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 elements will be eligible for inclusion in the capital base 
with certain limitations. E.g. the total of Tier 2 elements was limited up to 100 % of 
the total Tier 1 elements and subordinated term debt was limited up to 50 % of Tier 1 
elements. (Bank for International Settlements 1988, 17.) 
 
The framework concluded that certain deductions should have been made from capital 
base for the purpose of calculating the risk-weighted capital ratio. The deductions con-
sisted of goodwill, as deduction from Tier 1 capital elements, and investments in sub-
sidiaries engaged in banking and financial activities which are not consolidated in na-
tional systems. (Bank for International Settlements 1988, 7.) 
 
3.3 The risk-weighting system 
The Committee decided that the preferred method on assessment of the capital ade-
quacy of banks was a weighted risk ratio in which capital is related to different catego-
ries of assets or off-balance-sheet exposure and weighted according to categories of 
relative riskiness. The Committee believed that the risk ratio has several advantages 
over the simpler gearing ratio approach. They thought that it provides a fairer basis for 
making international comparisons between banking systems allowing off-balance sheet 
exposures to be included more easily into the measure. It allows banks to hold liquid or 
other assets which carry low risk. The framework divides assets to five weight catego-
ries (0, 10, 20, 50 and 100%). These are presented in more detail on Table 1. (Bank for 
International Settlements 1988, 8.) 
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Table 1. Risk-weights by category of on-balance-sheet assets (Bank for International 
Settlements 1988, 21-22) 
Risk-weight Asset 
0% - Cash 
- Claims on central governments and central banks 
- Other claims on OECD central governments and central banks 
- Claims collateralised by cash of OECD central-government secu-
rities or guaranteed by OECD central governments 
 
0, 10, 20 or 
50% (at nation-
al discretion) 
- Claims on domestic public-sector entities, excluding central gov-
ernment and loans guaranteed by such entities 
20% - Claims on multilateral development banks and claims guaranteed 
by, or collateralised by securities issued by such banks 
- Claims on banks incorporated in the OECD and loans guaranteed 
by OECD incorporated banks 
- Claims on banks incorporated in countries outside the OECD 
with a residual maturity of up to one year and loans with a maturi-
ty of up to one year guaranteed by banks in countries outside the 
OECD 
- Claims on non-domestic OECD public-sector entities, excluding 
central government, and loans guaranteed by such entities 
- Cash items in process of collection 
50% - Loans fully secured by mortgage on residential property that is or 
will be occupied by the borrower or that is rented 
100% - Claims on the private sector 
- Claims on banks incorporated outside the OECD with a residual 
maturity of over one year 
- Claims on central governments outside the OECD (unless de-
nominated in national currency and funded in that currency) 
- Claims on commercial companies owned by the public sector 
- Premises, plant and equipment and other fixed assets 
- Real estate and other investments 
- Capital instruments issued by other banks 
- All other assets 
 
As seen from the Table 1, there are many different kinds of risks that banks have to 
monitor. The credit risk is the major risk most banks but there are many other kinds of 
risks also e.g. investment risk and interest rate risk. The central focus of this framework 
was on credit risk. As seen on Table 1 we can see that credit risks especially concerning 
private sector are weighted to have the highest risk. (Bank for International Settlements 
1988, 8-9.) 
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3.4 The target standard ratio, transition and implementing arrangements 
After few consultations and preliminary testing of the framework, the Committee 
agreed that a minimum standard was set and that international banks generally should 
achieve it by the end of the transitional period. The target standard ratio of capital to 
weighted risk assets was at 8% (of which the core capital element will be at least 4%). 
International banks in member countries were expected to achieve this ratio by the end 
of 1992. (Bank for International Settlements 1988, 14.) 
 
The transitional arrangements were set. Additionally there were temporary standard to 
be met by the end of 1990. Supplementary elements were not allowed to be more than 
core capital and term subordinated debt within supplementary elements more than 
50% of Tier 1. General loan-loss reserves or general provisions were limited at the end 
of 1992 to 1.25 percentage points. (Bank for International Settlements 1988, 14-15.) 
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4 Basel II  
In June 2006 the Committee published comprehensive and revised version of Basel II 
framework and it was the outcome of additional proposals for consultations and three 
quantitative impact studies. The objective of this publication was to revise the 1988 
Accord to further strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking 
system. The Committee believed that the expected framework would support the 
adoption of stronger risk management practices. (Bank for International Settlements 
2006, 1-2.) 
 
In this revised framework the key elements of the 1988 capital adequacy framework 
were retained including general requirement to hold capital equivalent to at least 8% of 
their risk-weighted assets. A significant innovation was the greater use of assessments 
of risk provided by banks’ internal systems as inputs to capital calculations. It was 
more risks sensitive than the 1988 Accord and provided alternative options for deter-
mining the capital requirements for credit risk and operational risk. The framework in 
its revised form consists of three pillars (minimum capital requirements, supervisory 
review process and market discipline) but only the first pillar is covered in this report. 
(Bank for International Settlements 2006, 2-3.) 
 
4.1 Calculation of minimum capital requirements 
The first pillar presents the calculation of the total minimum capital requirements for 
credit, market and operational risks. The capital ratio is computed using the regulatory 
capital and risk-weighted assets. The total capital ratio must be no lower than 8% and 
Tier 2 capital is limited to 100% of Tier 1 capital. (Bank for International Settlements 
2006, 12.) 
 
The definitions of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital elements have not changed but Tier 3 capi-
tal element is added. Tier 3 may be used for short-term subordinated debt in the sole 
purpose of meeting a proportion of the capital requirements for market risks. Tier 3 
was limited to 250% of a bank’s tier capital that is required to support market risks. So 
according to the Basel II framework the capital of a bank consists of Core capital (Tier 
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1), Supplementary capital (Tier 2) and Tier 3 elements. (Bank for International Settle-
ments 2006, 244.) 
 
4.2 Risk-weighted assets 
According to the revised framework total risk-weighted assets are determined by mul-
tiplying the capital requirements for market risk and operational risk by 12.5 and add-
ing the resulting figures to sum of risk-weighted assets for credit risk. (Bank for Inter-
national Settlements 2006, 12.) 
 
4.2.1 Credit risk 
The Committee permitted banks to choose between two broad methodologies for cal-
culating their capital requirements for credit risk. These approaches were the standard-
ised approach and the internal ratings-based approach. (Bank for International Settle-
ments 2006, 19.) 
 
The standardised approach sets out revisions to the 1988 Accord for risk-weighting 
banking book exposures. It specifies revised standards for risk-weights for assets in-
cluding credit risk. The risk-weights of the standardised approach are based on the ex-
ternal credit ratings. (Bank for International Settlements 2006, 19.) 
 
Following the internal ratings-based approach the banks are allowed to use their inter-
nal rating systems for credit risk if approved by the bank’s supervisor. The IRB ap-
proach is based on measures of unexpected and expected losses. It defines out mini-
mum conditions and disclosure requirements that banks have to follow when they 
have been approved to trust in their own internal estimates of risk components in de-
termining the capital requirement for a given exposure. (Bank for International Settle-
ments 2006, 52.) 
 
Basel II introduced also a securitisation framework for credit risk. The securitisation 
framework must be applied by the banks in order to determine regulatory capital re-
quirements. Because securitisations may be structured in many different ways, this 
framework laid down the basis for the capital treatment of securitisation exposures. 
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The capital treatment of a securitisation exposure must be determined on the basis of 
economic substance rather than its legal form. Securitisation exposures can include e.g. 
mortgage-backed securities, liquidity facilities, interest rate or currency swaps and credit 
derivatives. (Bank for International Settlements 2006, 120.) 
 
4.2.2 Operational risk 
In the framework the operational risk is defined as the risk of loss resulting from inad-
equate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events. It in-
cludes legal risk, but excludes strategic and reputational risk. The framework presented 
three methods for calculating operational risk capital charges in continuum of increas-
ing sophistication and risk sensitivity i.e. the basic indicator approach, the standardised 
approach (SA) and advanced measurement approaches (AMA). The target was to en-
courage banks to implement more advanced measurement approaches for operational 
risks. (Bank for International Settlements 2006, 144.) 
 
4.2.3 Market risk 
Basel II defines the market risk as the risk of losses in on and off-balance-sheet posi-
tions arising from movements in market prices. The risks subject to this requirement 
were the risks pertaining to interest rate related instruments, equities in the trading 
book, foreign exchange risk and commodities risk throughout the bank. It sets out two 
broad methodologies of measuring the market risks. The objective of this part of the 
framework is to ensure that market risks are quantified based on data and by formal 
measurement methods. (Bank for International Settlements 2006, 157.) 
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5 Basel III 
In June 2011 the Basel Committee published the Basel III framework. It is a set of re-
form measures to strengthen the regulation, supervision and risk management of the 
banking sector. The objective is to improve the banking sector’s ability to absorb 
shocks arising from financial and economic stress and to reduce the risk of spill over 
from the financial sector to the real economy. It also aims to improve risk management 
and governance as well as to strengthen banks’ transparency and disclosures. (Bank for 
International Settlements 2011a, 1.) 
 
The Committee considered that it is critical that all the countries raise the resilience of 
the banking sectors to both internal and external shocks. This is done by strengthening 
the regulatory capital framework, building on the three pillars of the Basel II frame-
work. The Committee introduced these changes in order to minimise the disruption to 
capital instruments that are currently outstanding. (Bank for International Settlements 
2011a, 2-3.) 
 
Basel III introduces also a framework to promote the conservation of capital and the 
build-up of adequate buffers above minimum that can protect banks during the stress 
periods. The framework will give the supervisors stronger tools to promote capital 
conservation in the banking sector. This will provide a mechanism for rebuilding capi-
tal during economic recovery. (Bank for International Settlements 2011a, 6.) 
 
The Basel Committee proposed two minimum standards for funding liquidity to com-
plement the principles. The Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) was developed to promote 
the short-term resilience of bank’s liquidity risk profile. The Net Stable Funding Ratio 
(NSFR) was developed to provide a sustainable maturity structure of assets and liabili-
ties. This was done to improve banks’ long time resilience by creating additional incen-
tives to fund their activities with more stable funding sources on an on-going structural 
basis. (Bank for International Settlements 2011a, 8-9.) 
 
This study focuses on the first pillar of the Basel III framework while it contains the 
regulation of capital requirements and so is the essential part for this study. 
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5.1 Capital requirements and buffers 
The global banking system entered to the crisis with an insufficient level of high quality 
capital and the crisis revealed the variance in the definition of capital and the lack of 
disclosure across the jurisdictions. Thus the key element of new definition of capital - 
common equity - has the greater focus as the highest quality component of capital. 
(Bank for International Settlements 2011a, 12.) 
 
In the new framework the components of the capital are Tier 1 (divided to Common 
Equity Tier 1 and Additional Tier 1) and Tier 2 capital. These elements are subject to 
the following restrictions according to the Bank for International Settlements (2011a, 
64.):  
 
- Common Equity Tier 1 must be at least 4.5% of risk-weighted assets at all times 
- Tier 1 capital must be at least 6.0% of risk-weighted assets at all times 
- Total capital (Tier 1 plus Tier 2 capital) must be at least 8.0% of risk-weighted assets 
at all times. 
 
5.1.1 Common Equity Tier 1 capital 
Common Equity Tier 1 capital represents the highest quality components of capital. It 
consists of the sum of the following elements according to the Bank for International 
Settlements (2011a, 13.): 
 
- Common shares issued by bank 
- Stock surplus (share premium) resulting from the issues of instruments included 
Common Equity Tier 1 
- Retained earnings 
- Accumulated other comprehensive income and other disclosed reserves 
- Common shares issued by consolidated subsidiaries of the bank and held by third 
parties 
- Regulatory adjustments. 
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All of these have to meet the criteria for classification and for inclusion in the Com-
mon Equity Tier 1 capital. Retained earnings and other comprehensive income include 
interim profit and loss. Dividends are removed and the treatment of minority interest 
and the regulatory adjustments are discussed in chapter 5.1.4. (Bank for International 
Settlements 2011a, 13.) 
 
5.1.2 Additional Tier 1 capital 
The framework defines the minimum set of criteria for instruments issued by the bank 
to be included in Additional Tier 1 capital. This component consists of the following 
elements according to the Bank for International Settlements (2011a, 15.): 
 
- Instruments issued by the bank that meet the criteria for inclusion in Additional Tier 
1 capital (and are not included in Common Equity Tier 1) 
- Stock surplus (share premium) resulting from issue of instruments 
- Instruments issued by consolidated subsidiaries of the bank and held by third parties 
- Regulatory adjustments applied in the calculation of Additional Tier 1 capital. 
 
All of these elements have to meet the criteria for inclusion in Additional Tier 1 capital 
and are not included in Common Equity Tier 1(Bank for International Settlements 
2011a, 15). 
 
5.1.3 Tier 2 capital 
The objective of Tier 2 capital is to provide loss absorption on a gone-concern basis. 
Tier 2 capital consists of following elements that are not included in the Tier 1 capital. 
The elements have to meet the minimum set of criteria (Bank for international Settle-
ments 2011a, 17-18.): 
 
- Instruments issued by the bank that meet the criteria for inclusion in Tier 2 capital 
(and are not included in Tier 1 capital) 
- Stock surplus (share premium) resulting from the issue of instruments 
- Instruments issued by consolidated subsidiaries of the bank and held by third parties 
- Certain loan loss provisions 
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- Regulatory adjustments applied in the calculation of Tier 2 capital. 
 
5.1.4 Minority interest and regulatory adjustments 
The minority interest arising from the issue of common shares by a fully consolidated 
subsidiary of the bank may receive recognition in Common Equity Tier 1 only if the 
instrument giving rise to minority interest would meet all of the criteria for classifica-
tion as common shares for regulatory capital purposes; and the subsidiary that issued 
the instrument is itself a bank. (Bank for International Settlements 2011a, 19-20.) 
 
Total capital instruments issued by a fully consolidated subsidiary to third party inves-
tors may be recognised in total capital only if the instruments meet all the criteria for 
classification as Tier 1 or Tier 2 capital. The amount of this Tier 1 capital that is recog-
nised in Additional Tier 1 will exclude amounts recognised in Common Equity Tier 1 
capital. If the capital has been issued to third parties out of a special purpose vehicle, 
none of this can be included in Common Equity Tier 1 capital. This can be treated as if 
the bank itself has issued the capital directly to third parties and it meets all the relevant 
entry criteria and thus it can be included in Additional Tier 1 or Tier 2. (Bank for In-
ternational Settlements 2011a, 21.) 
 
Basel III sets out the regulatory adjustments to be applied to capital. In most cases 
these adjustments are applied in the calculation of Common Equity Tier 1. The ad-
justments are either deducted or derecognised (positive amounts should be deducted 
and negative amounts should be added back) in the calculation of Common Equity 
Tier 1. E.g. goodwill, deferred tax assets and investments in own shares will be deduct-
ed whereas cash flow hedge reserve and gains on sales related to securitisation transac-
tions should be derecognised. (Bank for International Settlements 2011a, 21-27.)  
 
5.1.5 Disclosure requirements 
In order to improve the transparency of regulatory capital and the market discipline, 
banks are required to disclose more information about their regulatory adjustments, 
main features of capital instruments and comprehensive explanation of ratios that in-
volve components of regulatory capital (e.g. Common Equity Tier 1). The banks are 
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also required to show on their websites the full terms and conditions of all instruments 
included in the regulatory capital. Also during the transition phase banks has to dis-
close the specific components of capital, including capital instruments and regulatory 
adjustments that are benefiting from the transitional provisions. (Bank for Internation-
al Settlements 2011a, 27.) 
 
5.1.6 Transitional arrangements 
According to the current information national implementation should begin on 1 Janu-
ary 2013. As of the beginning of the year banks will have to have 3.5% Common Equi-
ty Tier 1, 4.5% Tier 1 capital and 8.0% of total capital. All of the requirements are in 
relation to risk-weighted assets. The minimum Common Equity Tier 1 and Tier 1 re-
quirements will be phased-in between 1 January 2013 and 1 January 2015. The capital 
instruments that will not qualify as non-common equity Tier 1 capital or Tier 2 capital 
will be phased out. The phase in arrangements are presented in Attachment 1. (Bank 
for International Settlements 2011a, 27-28.) 
 
5.2 Risk coverage 
The risk coverage framework was revised in order to strengthen the capital treatment 
for certain complex securitisations. This requires banks to execute stricter credit anal-
yses of externally rated securitisation exposures. It requires also higher capital for trad-
ing and derivatives activities but also for the complex securitisations held in the trading 
book. A stressed value-at-risk framework was introduced to help justify periodicity. A 
capital charge for additional risk that estimates the default and migration risks of non-
securitised credit products but takes also into account the liquidity was also introduced. 
(Bank for International Settlements 2011b.) 
 
One aim of the Committee was to strengthen the counterparty credit risk framework. 
It included stricter requirements for measuring exposure, capital incentives for banks 
to use central counterparties for the derivatives and higher capital for inter-financial 
sector exposures. The Committee proposed that trade exposures to a qualifying central 
counterparties will receive a 2% risk-weight. (Bank for International Settlements 
2011b.) 
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5.3 Capital conservation buffer 
The capital conservation buffer is designed to ensure that banks would build up capital 
buffers outside stress periods which can be drawn down as losses are incurred. The 
requirement is based on simple capital conservation rules designed to avoid breaches 
of minimum capital requirements. When the buffers have been drawn down, the banks 
should look to rebuild them e.g. by reducing distributions of earnings, dividend pay-
ments, share-buybacks and staff bonus payments. The banks may also choose to raise 
new capital from the private sector. The implementation of the framework will help 
increase sector resilience both going into a downturn and provide the mechanism for 
rebuilding capital during the early stages of economic recovery. (Bank for International 
Settlements 2011a, 54-55.) 
 
The capital conservation buffer of 2.5% is established above the regulatory minimum 
requirements. The capital distribution restrictions will be imposed on a bank when cap-
ital levels fall within this range. The restrictions are imposed only to distributions, not 
to the operations of the bank. The bank must meet a minimum capital conservation 
ratio at various levels of the Common Equity Tier 1 capital ratios. E.g. Bank with 
CET1 ratio of 4.5-5.125% ratio is required to hold 100% of its earnings (no pay outs of 
dividends etc.). (Bank for International Settlements 2011a, 55.) 
 
The restrictions on distributions include dividends, share buybacks, discretionary pay-
ments on other Tier 1 capital instruments and discretionary bonus payments to staff 
while being applied on the consolidated group level. The banks should not choose to 
operate in the buffer range during stress-free times simply to compete with the other 
banks. In order to prevent this from happening the supervisors have the additional 
discretion to impose time limits on the banks operating within the buffer range. (Bank 
for International Settlements 2011a, 56.) 
 
The capital conservation buffer will be phased in between 1 January 2016 and the end 
of 2018 (Attachment 1). It begins at 0.625% of RWAs and will reach its final level of 
2.5% of RWAs on 1 January 2019. (Bank for International Settlements 2011a, 57.) 
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5.4 Countercyclical buffer 
The countercyclical buffer aims to ensure that banking sector capital requirements take 
into account the macro-financial environment in which the banks operate. It will be 
implemented by national jurisdictions when excess aggregate credit growth is judged to 
be associated with a build-up of a system-wide risk. This ensures that the banking sys-
tem has a buffer of capital to protect it against the potential losses in future. The buffer 
for internationally active banks will be a weighted average of the buffers implemented 
across all the jurisdictions to which the bank has credit exposures. (Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements 2011a, 57.) 
 
The national authorities will monitor credit growth and other indicators that may signal 
a build-up of the system risk and make assessments of whether credit growth is the 
leading cause. Based on the assessment authorities will put in place the countercyclical 
buffer requirement and release the buffer when the system-wide risk has drawn off. 
This buffer will vary between 0% and 2.5% of RWAs, depending on the extent of the 
system-wide risk. The jurisdiction will pre-announce its decision to raise the level of 
the countercyclical buffer by up to 12 months in order to give banks time to adjust. 
The decrease of the level of the buffer will take effect immediately. The buffers are 
determined specifically to each bank based on the geographic composition of its credit 
exposure portfolio. (Bank for International Settlements 2011a, 57-58.) 
 
The countercyclical buffer will be phased-in at the same time with the capital conserva-
tion buffer between 2016 and 2018. However, the jurisdictions may choose to imple-
ment larger countercyclical buffer requirements. The maximum countercyclical buffer 
will likewise follow the requirement of the capital conservation buffer levels (Attach-
ment 1). (Bank for International Settlements 2011a, 59.) 
 
5.5 Leverage ratio 
The build-up of excessive on-and off-balance sheet leverage in the banking system was 
one of the underlying issues of the crisis. Thus the Committee introduced a simple, 
transparent and non-risk based leverage ratio that act as a credible supplementary 
measure to risk based capital requirements. The ratio is intended to control the build-
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up of leverage in the banking sector and to help avoid instability in financial leveraging 
processes which could damage the economy and the wider financial system. It also 
reinforces the risk-based requirements with a non-risk-based backstop measure. The 
Committee will test a minimum Tier 1 3% leverage ratio from 1 January 2013 to 1 Jan-
uary 2017. Based on the results of this period, the final adjustments to definition and 
calibration of the leverage ratio will be performed in the first half of 2017. (Bank for 
International Settlements 2011a, 61-63.) 
 
According to the Sonali & Amadou the leverage ratio and the more complex risk-based 
requirements work well together. However, opinions about this compatibility vary. The 
leverage requirement provides a baseline level of capital to protect the safety net, while 
the risk-based requirement can capture additional risks that are not covered by the lev-
erage framework. The leverage ratio also ensures that a capital backstop remains even 
if model errors or other miscalculations impair the reliability of the risk-based capital. 
The leverage ratio promotes the stability and the resilience during difficult economic 
periods. (Sonali & Amadou 2012, 3.) 
 
5.6 Basel III monitoring exercise 
European Banking Authority has conducted a research presenting the results of the 
Basel III monitoring exercise as of 30 June 2011. A total of 158 banks submitted the 
data for this exercise. The banks were divided in to two groups. In this study is pre-
sented the results of the group one as the 48 banks in the group had a very high cover-
age of their banking systems. They reached 100% coverage for many jurisdictions. (Eu-
ropean Banking Authority 2012f, 2.) 
 
Since the new EU directive and regulation are not finalised yet, there was not any EU 
specific rules analysed in this exercise. It excludes also management actions to increase 
capital or decrease risk-weighted assets. So the monitoring exercise is based on the stat-
ic balance sheet assumptions. (European Banking Authority 2012f, 2.) 
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5.6.1 Impact on capital ratios 
In this research a full implementation of the Basel III framework is assumed as of 30 
June 2011. The Common Equity Tier 1 ratio would have declined from an average 
CET1 ratio of 10.2% to an average ratio of 6.5%. 80% of banks would be at or above 
the minimum 4.5% ratio while 44% would reach at least the 7.0% target level. This 
would indicate the CET1 capital shortfall of 18 billion euros at a minimum level and 
242 billion euros at the target level. (European Banking Authority 2012f, 3.) 
 
The average Tier 1 ratio showed a decline from 11.9% to 6.7% and the total capital 
ratio would have declined from 14.4% to 7.8%. Including the capital conservation 
buffer and the surcharge for systemically important banks, the banks’ capital shortfall 
raises to 361 billion euros of Tier 1 capital and 485 billion euros of total capital. (Euro-
pean Banking Authority 2012f, 3.) 
 
5.6.2 Main drivers of changes 
The overall impact on the CET1 ratio can be accounted as almost equal parts to 
changes in the definition of capital and to changes related to the calculation of risk-
weighted assets. CET1 declines by 22.7% and RWA increase by 21.2% on average. The 
RWA increase is mainly driven under the new framework as the exposures to counter-
party and market risks. The deductions in CET1 are mainly driven by goodwill and by 
the deductions for holdings of capital of other financial companies. (European Bank-
ing Authority 2012f, 4.) 
 
Introduction of the credit valuation adjustment (CVA) capital charges result in an aver-
age RWA increase of 8.0%. In addition the trading book exposures and the transition 
from Basel II 50/50 deductions to a 1250% risk-weight treatment are the main con-
tributors to the increase of RWA. (European Banking Authority 2012f, 4.) 
 
A positive correlation between bank size and the level of leverage was indicated in the 
monitoring results. The banks showed an average Basel III Tier 1 leverage ratio of 
2.7%. If a hypothetical current ratio was in place the banks would be at 4.0% leverage 
ratio. (European Banking Authority 2012f, 4.) 
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6 Risk-Weighted Assets 
While recovering from the global financial crisis the strengthening of capital ratios is 
one of the key priorities. The banks have to increase the quantity, quality and transpar-
ency of capital in order to restore the confidence on the banking sector. Recently the 
regulators have concentrated their reform action to improve the numerator of capital 
ratios. The changes to the denominator e.g. RWAs have been more limited. In July 
2011 the Basel Committee has announced that it will start working on RWAs. 
 
Still today the credit risks are calculated under Basel I or Basel II. In 2007 by the Capi-
tal Requirements Directive Basel II framework was required to be implemented in Eu-
ropean banks. 
 
6.1 Developments in RWA measures 
Basel I proposed a simple framework which is based on the four broad categories of 
claims. These categories were sovereigns, banks, mortgages, and corporates. The risk 
sensitivity of capital requirements was aimed to be improved with Basel II framework. 
(Sonali & Amadou 2012, 6.) 
 
In 1996 the Basel Committee included the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach to 
Basel II framework. For the determination of capital requirements for market risk the 
value-at risk (VaR) approach was incorporated into the Basel II framework. In 2004 a 
similar approach to credit risk was included into the Basel II. It gave an opportunity 
for the banks to determine risk-weights by using their own internal ratings systems or 
external credit rating agencies. The internal ratings system required supervisory valida-
tion. The banks were enabled to calculate the parameters of a uniform regulatory for-
mula. (Sonali & Amadou 2012, 6.) 
 
Basel II added simplified approaches for the risk categories. Compared to Basel I for 
the credit risk was provided a much more differentiated treatment of exposures based 
on the standardised approach (SA). It allowed risk-weights to vary for each exposure 
according to the external credit rating agencies ratings (Attachment 2). However, the 
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external ratings could drive risk-weights higher than 100%, but also they could drive 
weightings much lower. (Sonali & Amadou 2012, 6-7.) 
 
Basel III is planned to mostly strengthen the numerator but it provides also limited 
changes to RWAs. The numerator of risk-based capital ratios is significantly improved 
in the Basel III. It also introduces an international leverage ratio, capital conservation 
buffer and countercyclical buffer requirements. Basel III requires also additional loss 
absorbency to be met with a progressive Common Equity Tier 1 from the systemically 
important banks (SIBs). (Le Leslé & Avramova 2012, 37.) 
 
Over the last decade the risk-weighted assets that banks report to regulator have de-
clined steadily. This and the other signs support the idea that in an attempt to minimise 
regulatory burdens banks can “optimise” their capital by under-reporting RWA. (Sonali 
& Amadou 2012, 16.) 
 
“The asymmetry of information between banks, supervisors, and market participants 
regarding how risky RWA are can lead to increased uncertainty about the adequacy of 
bank capital, which during a financial crisis can have damaging effects for financial sta-
bility.” (Sonali & Amadou 2012, 16-17.) 
 
6.2 Differences between regions 
During the financial crisis smaller countries were following Basel I regulation while 
countries in the Asia with large financial sectors followed Basel II. Basel I regulation 
requires banks to appoint certain risk-weights to assets in specified categories while it 
tries to minimise manipulation possibilities. Only the largest international US banks 
were required to implement Basel II regulation by 2012 while rest of US banks contin-
ue to follow Basel I. Already before the financial crisis European banks were required 
to implement Basel II guidelines due to Capital Requirements Directive. As described 
in Basel II banks were allowed to use own internal modes for risk-weight determina-
tion purposes. (Sonali & Amadou 2012, 13-14.) 
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Figure 1. RWAs over Total Assets in Asia, Europe and North America 2002-2010 
(Sonali & Amadou 2012, 6) 
 
As the Figure 1 presents, these regulatory differences in RWAs are higher for the US 
and the Asian banks and lower for European banks. Le Leslé and Avramova (2012, 18) 
note that “historical default rates in Europe over the last 15 years have been consist-
ently below those in Asia and in the US, which together with the use of the IRB ap-
proaches in Europe explain lower RWA reported by European banks.” 
 
By using a sample of the largest banks, Le Leslé and Avramova found that “European 
banks have lower RWA as a share of total assets than the US and Asian banks, even 
after controlling the differences in the business model and regulatory regime.” The 
retail banks tend to have the highest RWA as a share of total assets and investment 
banks the lowest, with universal banks in-between. The investment banks are expected 
to have relatively lower RWA to total assets because of their larger trading books, 
which until recently required lower risk-weights than banking book assets. The changes 
to the Basel II market risk framework will require higher levels of capital for some ac-
tivities such as securitisation, proprietary trading, and mark-to market losses (credit 
value adjustments). (Le Leslé & Avramova 2012, 8-12.) 
 
6.3 RWAs & stock returns during Eurozone debt crisis 
Sonali and Amadou (2012, 12) studied the impact of the risk-weighted assets to banks’ 
stock returns during the crisis period 2007-2008. The study indicated that stock returns 
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are lower for the banks with higher risk-weighted assets. This also confirmed the find-
ings of Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiach and Merrouche (2010). Sonali’s and Amadou’s 
study pointed out the fact that relationship between the RWAs and the stock returns is 
remarkable and the banks with a one percentage point higher RWAs to tangible assets 
ratio have a 0,06 percentage points lower stock return. (Sonali & Amadou 2012, 12-13.) 
 
Banks with higher stock returns usually can achieve more stable funding opportunities, 
more liquid assets, a lower share of non-performing loans, and a higher accounting 
return on assets. After all, according to the Sonali and Amadou strong statistical rela-
tionship with the stock returns can be seen only on the liquidity of the assets and the 
accounting return on assets. (Sonali & Amadou 2012, 12-13.) 
 
During the financial crisis the banking stock returns showed a negative relationship 
between RWAs and stock returns. This can be seen as a sign that investors may use 
risk-weighted assets as an indicator of bank portfolio risk. During the severe phase of 
the crisis, from July 2007 to September 2008, banks with higher risk-weighted assets 
performed worse. When is looked into the on-going crisis in Europe can be seen a 
similar result. (Sonali & Amadou 2012, 16.) 
 
In the countries where the banks can use own models for calculation of RWA, the rela-
tionship between stock returns and RWAs is weaker. The implementation of Basel II 
before the crisis weakens this relationship.  
 
While comparing regions with different regulatory structures can be seen that the rela-
tionship between stock returns and RWAs is weaker in countries where banks have 
more discretion in calculation of RWAs. It is specifically in countries that had imple-
mented Basel II before the recent financial crisis. In the end RWAs do not predict 
market measures of the bank risk when it comes to risk measures on stock-market. 
(Sonali & Amadou 2012, 16.) 
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7 Capital positioning on European banks 
This study concentrates to specific sample of the banks on the European Banking Au-
thority’s (EBA) recommendation and to the specific capital ratios presented in follow-
ing sections. In the study is presented the results of current situation of capital posi-
tioning on European banks. In the study was analysed how the banks were able to 
reach the recommended capital ratios by the end of June 2012. This study presents 
through the case companies also the possible actions taken to reach the recommenda-
tions. 
 
The banks have been at the centre of the financial crisis since 2008. Thus the Europe-
an Commission proposed to change the behaviour of European banks which amount 
for 53 % of the global assets. In July 2011 the Commission started to translate the in-
ternational standards on bank capital, most commonly known as the Basel III agree-
ment, to a new directive in Europe, CRD IV. Europe will be leading on this matter, 
applying these rules to more than 8000 banks. (European Commission 2011.) 
 
The European Banking Authority (EBA) published on 8th December a formal recom-
mendation related to banks’ recapitalisation needs. These measures are part of broader 
package to restore stability and confidence in the markets in the EU. The recommen-
dation stated that national supervisory authorities should demand banks to strengthen 
their capital positions by establishing an exceptional and temporary buffer by the end 
of June 2012. EBA stated that Core Tier 1 capital ratio should reach a level of 9 % be-
fore the deadline. The buffers are designed to provide a reassurance to markets about 
the banks’ ability to resist shocks and still maintain adequate capital. 8th of December 
EBA identified a shortfall of 144.7 billion euros. (European Banking Authority 2011a, 
1-3.) 
 
The national authorities required banks to submit their plans describing actions to be 
taken in order to meet the set targets. The EBA’s Board of Supervisors made on 9th of 
February a preliminary assessment of plans. The review highlighted that the shortfalls 
would be decreased primarily through direct capital measures which according to EBA 
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should not have a negative impact on lending into the real economy. (European Bank-
ing Authority 2011a, 2; European Banking Authority 2012a 1.) 
 
7.1 Overview of the recapitalisation plans 
EBA’s recommendation was addressed to 71 banks that participated in the 2011 EU-
wide stress test. However, small non cross-border banks were excluded. Three banks 
had also been identified as undergoing a significant restructuring process and thus were 
not assessed against the EBA’s demand. These banks were Österreichische Volksbank 
AG, Dexia and WetLB AG. The composition of capital as of 30 September 2011 and 
banks included in the sample are presented in Attachment 3. (European Banking Au-
thority 2011b, 9.) 
 
Österreichische Volksbank AG was excluded because the group was under deep re-
structuring and evaluation of its business model. Dexia was also excluded because the 
group had indeed been restructured. The restructured group will not further develop 
significant cross-border activity and thus were not remained in the EBA sample. (Eu-
ropean Banking Authority 2012a, 3.) 
 
The capital package of Greece had been defined on the EU/IMF programme. The 
programme already defined a set of targets for banks including objectives for the Core 
Tier 1 ratio. Thus no new benchmarks had been set for the Greek banks. As an EFTA 
state of the EEA Norwegian banks are within the competence of the Norwegian au-
thorities when it comes to any requirements and supervisory action pertaining to capi-
tal needs. Therefore the focus was on the recapitalisation plans and Board of Supervi-
sors identified 78 billion euros shortfall for the banks left in the sample. (European 
Banking Authority 2012a, 3.) 
 
7.2 Definition of Core Tier 1 
The definition of Core Tier 1 was the same that was used in the 2011 EU-wide stress 
test and it included existing capital instruments subscribed by governments. It com-
promised the highest quality capital instruments (common equity) and hybrid instru-
ments provided by governments. The definition is based on existing EU legislation in 
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the Capital Requirements Directive which had been developed based on Basel III. It 
takes the existing definition of Tier 1 net of deductions of participations in financial 
institutions and strips out hybrid instruments, but also recognises the existing govern-
ment support measures. The Core Tier 1 is a temporary term while the directive is un-
der development. It equals almost to Common Equity Tier 1 definition presented in 
Basel III framework with the differences stated above. (European Banking Authority 
2011b, 9.) 
 
In order to ensure a fully corresponding computation from all banks in sample, the 
EBA mapped the capital elements of Core Tier 1 to current reporting framework 
(COREP), presented in Attachment 4. Only the highest quality commercial instru-
ments were included and the inclusion government support measures reflected to the 
expectation that instruments will be fully available to absorb losses and shelter banks. 
Government support measures needed to be approved by the European Commission 
and in line with European State aid rules. (European Banking Authority 2011b, 9.) 
 
7.3 Risk-weighted assets  
The risk-based capital guidelines recognised credit risk by segmenting and weighting 
requirements. The guidelines established a credit risk-weight for all assets. The credit 
risks were divided under different classifications e.g. Treasury securities were consider 
to carry 0% risk-weight. The book value of the asset was multiplied by the credit risk-
weight to determine the amount of core and supplementary capital that the bank need-
ed to support that asset. Risk-weighted assets were result of this calculation. (Fabozzi 
& Modi-gliani 2009, 51.) 
 
As in the 2011 EU-wide stress test, banks had been requested to follow CRD III for 
the calculation of Core Tier 1 ratio (attachments 4 and 5). The banks should have also 
followed the changes in the trading book and securitisation treatment (Basel II) in the 
requirement. The risk-weighted assets were computed by multiplying the total capital 
requirements (including the Basel 1 transitional floor) with 12.5. Thus Core Tier 1 ratio 
was computed as follows according to the European Banking Authority (2011b, 10.): 
 
“Core Tier 1 Ratio = Core Tier 1 capital/RWA.” 
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7.4 Floors 
Banks using advanced measurement approaches for credit and operational risk (IRB & 
AMA) had been asked by EBA to apply the Basel I floors (80%). There have been a 
variety of ways in which floors have been adapted nationally and banks have followed 
different approaches which depend on the national guidance. EBA requested National 
Supervisory Authorities to choose from two most widely used approaches and instruct 
the banks to adapt chosen approach to their jurisdiction. (European Banking Authority 
2011b, 10.) 
 
Approach 1 assessed the total minimum own funds that would be required under Basel 
I against the total minimum own funds according to the relevant regulation. The recap-
italisation exercise banks were required to apply the CRD III market risk requirement. 
(European Banking Authority 2011b, 11.) 
 
Approach 2 assessed the total own funds that would be required under Basel I against 
total own funds as of September 2011. It also applied the CRD III market risk re-
quirement. (European Banking Authority 2011b, 11.) 
 
The main difference between of these two approaches was how the total own funds 
were assessed. In approach 1 the own funds were assessed against required relevant 
regulation. In approach 2 the own funds were assessed against amount of total own 
funds as of September 2011. 
 
Under both approaches the RWAs corresponding to the transitional floor capital re-
quirements were computed according to the European Banking Authority (2011b, 11): 
 
“RWA Floor: 12.5*Transitional floor capital requirement.” 
 
7.5 Computation of the target capital buffers 
The computation of the capital buffers combined following five steps. 
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First, prudential filters on EEA sovereign exposures held in the AFS (Available for 
sale) portfolio were removed. Banks were required to build a buffer of Core Tier 1 cap-
ital vis-á-vis prudential filters. If the filter was positive, it implied a negative AFS valua-
tion reserve (potential losses). Also in countries where prudential filters were not ap-
plied, the impact of the valuation of assets in the AFS portfolio was directly reflected 
in capital position. (European Banking Authority 2011b, 13.) 
 
Second, EEA debt sovereign exposures in the held-to-maturity (HTM) and loans and 
receivable portfolio were valued in a conservative fashion, making use end of Septem-
ber data as a reference for loans and non-traded assets. Thus banks had been required 
to build a buffer of Core Tier 1 capital (BufferHTM) equal to the difference between 
the book value of those assets and their revalued amount. (European Banking Authori-
ty 2011b, 13.) 
 
Third, banks had been allowed to offset positive and negative value adjustments for 
the debt securities in the HTM and leverage ratio portfolios. For loans and advances in 
the HTM and LR portfolios banks could not benefit from potential gains. (European 
Banking Authority 2011b, 13.) 
 
Fourth, the sum of BufferAFS and BufferHTM had been cabbed to zero, i.e. banks 
could not end up with a negative buffer (BufferSOV= (BufferHTM + BufferAFS) ≥0) 
(European Banking Authority 2011b, 13.). 
 
And last the capital shortfall was the sum of the difference between 9% of risk-
weighted assets and the actual Core Tier 1 capital plus Buffer SOV. The formula was 
following according to the European Banking Authority (2011b, 13.): 
 
“Shortfall = (9% RWA – CT1) + BufferSOV.” 
 
By the end of June 2012 the shortfall had to be zero.  
 
The shortfall had been set based on September 2011 sovereign exposure figures and a 
capital requirement determined by the 9% Core Tier 1 threshold. It also noted that the 
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buffer to be held against sovereign debt exposures was fixed and it was not revised as a 
result of later market valuation changes and/or changes of the exposures, even though 
banks had until the end of June 2012 to meet the overall capital target. (European 
Banking Authority 2011b, 13.) 
 
7.6 Banks’ actions to achieve required capital positioning  
EBA had set some guidance on the recommendation to banks. They set proposed mix 
of actions in order to bring the shortfall to zero by June 2012. EBA preferred that the 
banks should first use private sources of funding to create the capital buffer, including 
retained earnings, reduced bonus payments, new issuances of common equity and suit-
ably strong contingent capital, and other liability management measures. (European 
Banking Authority 2011b, 13-14.) 
 
The reductions in risk-weighted assets due to validation and roll-out of appropriate 
internal models to additional portfolios were not allowed unless the changes were al-
ready planned and under consideration by the competent authority. It could simply be 
used to a transfer contracts or business units to a third party. The reduction in risk-
weighted assets as a means of reaching the target was limited to selected sales of assets 
that did not lead to a reduced flow of lending to real economy. (European Banking 
Authority 2011b, 14.) 
 
These measures and guidelines limited the possible actions. The banks had option to 
increase their capital adequacy ratios in two ways: by increasing the amount of regula-
tory capital held, which boosts the numerator of the ratio, or by decreasing the risk-
weighted assets, which is the denominator of the regulatory ratio. The important part 
of EBA’s guidance was that banks were not able to modify their calculation approaches 
of risk-weighted assets and thus attain the target. (Sonali & Amadou 2012, 3.) 
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8 The preliminary results of  EBA’s recapitalisation exercise 
Since December 2011, the EBA’s recommendation to national authorities required 
participating EU banks to reach 9% Core Tier 1 ratio. For 27 banks the EBA recog-
nised a shortfall of 76 billion euros. This shortfall should have been filled by the end of 
June 2012. The banks’ options to achieve this were to increase the highest quality capi-
tal elements and reduce risk-weighted assets through limited set of actions. These ac-
tions should have been performed without impacting into the real economy. (Europe-
an Banking Authority 2012c, 1.) 
 
The primary objective of this exercise was to strengthen banks’ capital positions and 
thus to increase the confidence to markets in the banking sector. This was really im-
portant act during the fight against the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. It was im-
portant to show that banks have still ability to withstand shocks and to stay well pro-
tected against remaining credit risk. This capital package was an act to reassure inves-
tors about the future of the banking sector. (European Banking Authority 2012d, 1.) 
 
8.1 The sample 
The sample of 71 EEA banks took part in the capital exercise, of which 31 banks, ex-
cluding Greek banks, had a shortfall to a 9% CT1 ratio. The figures include the sover-
eign buffer. 28 banks outlined their capital plans to comply with EBA’s recommenda-
tion. The remaining three banks (Dexia, Österreichische Volksbank AG and WestLB 
AG) are currently under deep restructuring process. Despite that Bankia submitted 
their capital plan it will be monitored separately as it is also under serious restructuring 
process. Thus the current report recognises shortfall of 76 billion euros reported by 27 
banks. (European Banking Authority 2012c, 3.) 
 
The only Finnish bank included in the sample, OP-Pohjola Group, was above the re-
quired 9% CT1 ratio. Thus there were not any requirements for Finnish banks in this 
recapitalisation exercise. Also Danske Group and Nordea, which operate in Finland, 
met the requirements beforehand.  
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8.2 Outcome 
According to the preliminary results the banks have followed the schedule of the 
EBA’s recommendation. As of 30 June 2012, the 27 banks reported that they had 
reached a recapitalisation amount of 94.4 billion euros. This amount was reached as a 
result of the capital plans. It included the implementation of capital measures and the 
capital released through the implementation of limited RWA measures. The divisions 
of different measures are presented in the Figure 2. (European Banking Authority 
2012c, 5.)  
 
 
Figure 2. Final recap amount against the initial shortfall (European Banking Authority 
2012c, 5) 
 
76% of the total recap amount was collected by implementing capital measures and 
thus increasing eligible own funds. The execution of RWA measures released a capital 
that amounted for 24%. The backstop measures mainly consisted of new issuance of 
capital instruments. The governments directly or through the support of the European 
Financial Stability Facility underwrote these backstop instruments. (European Banking 
Authority 2012c, 5-6.)  
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8.2.1 Direct capital measures 
Since September 2011 the 27 banks had increased their core capital (including ordinary 
equity and reserves) by 41 billion euros by issuing new ordinary shares, payment of 
dividends in shares, retained earnings and conversion of hybrids into common capital. 
Ordinary capital had increased by additional 6.4 billion euros, taking into account the 
scheduled conversion into shares of hybrid instruments. Thus the total amount that 
the 27 banks had increased their core capital rose to 47.4 billion euros. (European 
Banking Authority 2012c, 6.) 
 
The banks had also issued Buffer Convertible Capital Securities which complied with 
the EBA’s Common Term sheet. These were issued for total amount of 11.5 billion 
euros (12% of the total recap amount). These bonds were eligible to meet the EBA’s 
recommendation even though they are not Core Tier 1 instruments. (European Bank-
ing Authority 2012c, 7.) 
 
Other mitigating measures impacting directly banks’ capital position amounted for 12.6 
billion euros. These impacts were due to following actions according to the European 
Banking Authority (2012c, 7.): 
 
- “Lower deductions from Core Tier 1 capital (e.g. depreciation/disposal of goodwill 
and intangible assets, disposal of securitisation portfolios, reduction in the differ-
ence between expected losses and specific provisions in case of Internal ratings 
based models, disposal of non-consolidated subsidiaries/stakes on financial firms); 
- Consolidation impacts on capital (e.g. increase on minority interest) 
- Further impairments on sovereign exposures accounted after September 2011.” 
 
The write downs of sovereign exposures were included as additional mitigating 
measures within the limit of the country component of the sovereign buffer. This was 
done to avoid double counting of losses, (European Banking Authority 2012c, 7). 
 
The division of direct capital measures described is presented on the Figure 3. 
 39 
 
Figure 3. Direct capital impact measures, percentage of the recap amount (European 
Banking Authority 2012c, 6)  
 
Before the capital exercise when banks would define their Core Tier 1, the common 
equity and hybrid instruments provided by governments seemed to be favoured by 
EBA. EBA added also that new issued private contingent instruments (CoCos) were 
accepted if they were in line with strict criteria and high quality. As a private capital 
allocation possibility the banks were commanded to use liability management, retained 
earnings, withholding dividends and bonuses. (Reuters 2011.) 
 
The newly-issued private contingent instruments in the capital structure were accepted 
because the sovereign situation was deterioration significantly. Since the buffers were 
intended to absorb potential (contingent) losses, new private Cocos were allowed.  
By the end of October 2012 the existing convertible capital instruments have to be 
transformed to common equity in order to be in line with EBA’s criteria. (Reuters 
2011.)  
 
According to the some hybrid specialists any contingent capital trade would help banks 
by giving some time for them to get their houses in order. That has been seen as a 
main advantage of using CoCos. This has been used e.g. in UK and Ireland as a way to 
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boost their capital level and limit potential further losses on banks’ bad loans. (Reuters 
2011.) 
 
8.2.2 RWA measures 
The capital impact of RWA measures accounted for 24%, detailed information is pre-
sented on Figure 4. This was due to a few actions taken during this period. For a few 
banks some deleveraging actions were allowed in specified agreements with EU and 
international organisations. These measures were related to a decrease in lending. (Eu-
ropean Banking Authority 2012c, 7.) 
 
Disposals of assets lead to a RWA reduction of 90 billion euros impacting positively to 
capital by 8.1 billion euros. The disposals concentrated mainly on non-core assets (e.g. 
US dollar denominated assets held outside the EU) in few banks. Deleveraging and 
disposal of assets were broadly discussed and the host supervisors had chance to show 
their concerns on measures impacting to their banking sectors. (European Banking 
Authority 2012c, 7.) 
 
The RWAs were reduced with other mitigating measures by 30.6 billion euros. The 
reduction was achieved with improvement in collaterals and guarantees and impacts 
originating from the application of CRD III. In some cases more detailed calculations 
on the implementation of CRD III led to a reduction on the RWA figures. (European 
Banking Authority 2012c, 8.) 
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Figure 4. Capital impact of RWA measures, percentage of Recap amount (European 
Banking Authority 2012c, 6) 
 
In some cases where changes had already been planned and were under consideration 
by the competent authority the reductions in RWAs were allowed. In the process of 
reduction on the capital shortfall these were the only cases where RWA were allowed 
to be reduced due to validation, roll-out and changes of internal models. (European 
Banking Authority 2012c, 8.) 
 
As clearly stated in the EBA’s recommendation, it did not allow banks to “tweak” their 
RWAs calculations as a mean of reaching the target. Thus EBA tried to ensure that the 
so called “risk-weighted asset optimisation” would not have been possible. Compared 
to September the figures showed that the RWAs had reduced only by 0.62% due to the 
use of the other mitigating measures. The other mitigating measures included im-
provements of assets quality and impacts originating from the application of CRD III. 
(European Banking Authority 2012d, 3-4.) 
 
8.2.3 Backstop measures 
The public backstops contributed to an injection of fresh capital by 9.5 billion euros 
(Figure 2). The few banking groups had complied with the EBA’s recommendation 
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and the Core Tier 1 capital requirements with these capital increases. (European Bank-
ing Authority 2012c, 8.) 
 
The recapitalisation operations of three Portuguese banking groups (Caixa Geral de 
Depósitos, Banco Commercial Português Sa and Banco BPI SA) were concluded after 
the instruments subscribed by Portuguese State were established. The Slovenian Nova 
Ljublanska Banka reached also the 9% level with the government support. Also the 
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena reached the required level due to government support 
that took form of capitalisation instruments up to an amount of 2 billion euros. (Euro-
pean Banking Authority 2012c, 8-9.) 
 
8.2.4 Other cases 
Nova KBM was above the 9% target as of end of September 2011. They had subse-
quently shown a shortfall mainly due to the recognition of further credit risk impair-
ments. The bank has submitted a detailed capital plan to the EBA in order to meet the 
9% target. The capital plan expects to meet the target by September 2012 through pri-
vate investors. If necessary the backstops are in place with an ultimate and eventual 
recapitalisation by the Republic of Slovenia with a deadline of 31 December 2012. (Eu-
ropean Banking Authority 2012c, 9.) 
 
Norddeutsche Landesbank –GZ has achieved the 9% core Tier 1 by the end of June 
after implementing their capital plan. The final validation of the implemented measures 
is subject to the final formal endorsement by the EU Commission of the on-going 
state-aid investigation. It appeared that this agreement is on track for a final decision to 
be taken immediately. (European Banking Authority 2012c, 9.) 
 
Bankia is under restructuring process and they have requested for financial support 
from the EFSF. Banco de España, with the EU Commission, ECB, EBA and IMF, is 
currently carrying out a comprehensive asset quality review on a number of Spanish 
banks. Some of these banks under review are participated in the capital exercise and 
now their final capital needs are being assessed. (European Banking Authority 2012c, 
9.) 
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8.2.5 Impacts  
On the EBA’s recommendation was ensured that banks did not reduce risk-weighted 
assets in order to achieve the target ratio. Disposal of assets due the EBA recommen-
dation reduced risk-weighted assets with 90 billion euros. This is only 1.8% less com-
pared to September 2011. The reductions were due to disposals of non-core assets in 
predetermined banks. (European Banking Authority 2012d, 4.) 
 
According to the EBA the capital exercise had not negative impact on lending to the 
real economy. The new lending levels of EU banks’ are driven primarily by credit de-
mand, by banks seeking to avoid future asset quality problems, by funding shortages 
and also by capital restrictions. As part of recommendation some deleveraging 
measures were agreed to be part of the capital plans. These measures reduced the risk-
weighted assets with 30.3 billion euros. The measures were taken in few banks that 
were predetermined with international and EU organisations. The BIS quarterly review 
showed that despite the strong pressure for deleveraging in Europe during the final 
quarter of 2011, there is no evidence that the deleveraging process had become exces-
sive and disorderly, with disruptive consequences on the real economy. (European 
Banking Authority 2012d, 4.) 
 
However, adjustments to new regulation and capital requirements have tightened credit 
standards on euro area banks. The banks have admitted that tightened standards have 
been used in 25 % of euro area banks for loans to large enterprises, in 8% for loans to 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). For loans to households the tightening on 
standards has happened in 12% of euro area banks and for consumer credit in 7% of 
banks. (European Central Bank 2012, 17.) 
 
8.2.6 Next steps 
For all banks included in the sample the monitoring of the fulfilment of the recom-
mendation will be continued by supervisory authorities. To better understand the risks 
underlying banks’ capital positions the national supervisors may undertake a detailed 
review of individual bank’s asset quality. Until the transition to the CRD IV has hap-
pened, the recommendation and the 9% core tier capital ratio will remain into force. 
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The transition will be ensured by capital conservation in 2013 and beyond. (European 
Banking Authority 2012e.) 
 
8.3 Commerzbank 
Commerzbank has outlined its capital raising plans in the media. It has been criticised 
quite a lot in the media. It has revealed it plans to strengthen its capital alone without 
state aid. European Banking Authority identified 5.3 billion euros gap on September 
2011. Commerzbank outlined in its plans that it could strengthen capital by 6.3 billion 
euros in total. They did not intend to ask investors for fresh capital. (Financial Times 
2012.) 
 
The German government owns 25 per cent of the bank and has given its private sup-
port. Commerzbank’s plan needed the backing of the Germany’s banking supervisors, 
BaFin. (Financial Times 2012.) 
 
Commerzbank used few different actions to achieve their goal. They boosted their net 
income by repurchasing some hybrid debt and asset sales. Although, most of Com-
merzbank’s plans relied on scaling back risk-weighted assets, partly through cutting 
some unwanted business but also through better risk calibration agreed with BaFin. 
This reduced quite a lot their need for capital. By cutting RWAs they intended to re-
duce 3.1 billion euros of capital towards the EBA’s target. (Financial Times 2012.) 
 
Cutting the RWAs has been criticised in media by many financial professionals. All of 
them agree that banks are just playing with their calculation methods of RWAs instead 
of doing any real actions to achieve the EBA’s target. (Financial Times 2012.) 
 
Commerzbank intended also to save 250 million euros of capital by paying the staff 
bonuses in its own shares (Financial Times 2012).  
 
8.3.1 First quarter 
By the end of March 2012 Commerzbank had achieved the capital target of 5.3 billion 
euros and generated additional buffer of 1.1 billion euros. They had reduced their op-
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erating expenses during the first quarter by 17% compared to 2011. Due to successful 
risk reduction Commerzbank had also reduced the loan loss provisions in commercial 
real estate financing by more than 30% (to 212 million euros) compared to first quarter 
of 2011 (318 million euros). Commerzbank used their retained earnings to strengthen 
the Core Tier 1 capital by 0.4 billion euros. Additionally, the reduction in risk-weighted 
assets contributed 1.2 billion euros, reduction in regulatory capital deductions and oth-
er measures contributed 0.6 billion euros. The measures to improve the capital struc-
ture strengthened the Core Tier 1 capital by 0.7 billion euros. (Commerzbank 2012a.) 
 
Risk-weighted assets had reduced by 10% compared to previous year and thus Core 
Tier 1 ratio rose to 11.3%. Compared to 2011 the risk-weighted assets were reduced by 
14 billion euros. This was due to a reduction of non-core assets. Additionally the re-
purchase of hybrid equity instruments amounted for more than 760 million euros in 
March 2012. A positive impact on the capital base was also on the reduction of regula-
tory capital deductions. (Commerzbank 2012a.) 
 
8.3.2 First half of 2012 
Commerzbank achieved the EBA’s capital target of 5.3 billion euros by the end of June 
2012 by exceeding the target by 2.8 billion euros. During the first half of 2012, Com-
merzbank generated a one billion euro operating profit. The measures behind this were 
the decreased market interest rate level and the customer activity. They also increased 
their Core Tier 1 ratio to 12.2%. The major measures behind the whole achievement 
were retained earnings, improvement of the capital structure and reduction in the risk-
weighted assets. (Commerzbank 2012b.) 
 
Commerzbank is currently reviewing its all business areas on its annual strategic plan-
ning process. However, the Commerzbank concentrates on its customer-centric and 
sustainably profitable core business while their target is to be well positioned for Basel 
III capital requirements. The bank expects a 10% Core Tier ratio including all the re-
quirements of Basel III to be met at the beginning of 2013. The Commerzbank con-
tinues to reduce risks and capital lockup. (Commerzbank 2012b.) 
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8.4 Danske Bank 
Mikko Laukka from Danske Group was interview for this study. He is the First Vice 
President of Regulatory & Economic Capital unit. His unit is responsible the Group’s 
credit risk, economic capital and calculation of capital adequacy. They are part of Risk 
& Capital function where they model e.g. risk parameters. This chapter presents how 
Danske Group survived on capital exercise and how they are prepared for future regu-
lation. It also includes Laukka’s own opinions on reasons behind the development, 
success and future of Danske Group. Some of these are Laukka’s opinions and might 
differ from the views of Danske Group. 
 
8.4.1 Capital exercise 
The Danske Group is and has been a financially sound banking group. The Group has 
increased its capital adequacy by increasing the amount of capital. This can be seen in 
Table 2. The Group succeeded well in the stress test June 2011 and was already beyond 
the European Banking Authority’s capital adequacy demand at the point when the 
EBA’s recommendation took in place. At the end of 2011 the Group had Core Tier 1 
capital ratio of 11.8% which is clearly above European Banking Authority’s 9% target. 
 
Table 2. Danske Group Statement of capital (Danske Bank 2012b, 65) 
 
DKK millions Core Tier 1 capital Tier 1 Capita Capital base RWA 
2010 85,106 124,837 149,745 844,209 
of RWA 10,1 % 14,8 % 17,7 %   
2011 106,826 145,017 162,065 905,979 
of RWA 11,8 % 16,0 % 17,7 %   
 
The Group has not updated the capital adequacy targets since the financial crisis start-
ed. This due to fact that from the perspective of capital adequacy has been essential to 
keep and increase their strong capital adequacy ratio because it has on the current mar-
ket situation even more effect on the price of refinancing. The targets will be updated 
in the near future and they will take into account the price of the financing, dividends 
policy and portfolio strategy. (Laukka, M. 28 Aug 2012.) 
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On the long term the Group’s strategy to achieve the set capital adequacy targets by 
using the high quality ICAAP process, risk management and right pricing strategy for 
liabilities. The ICAAP process takes into account the earnings, effects of the shocks, 
dividends policies and the planning of the capital structure. (Laukka, M. 28 Aug 2012.) 
 
8.4.2 Risk-weighted assets 
On the development of measurement of the risk-weighted assets the Group has fol-
lowed the regulations. Before the Group has used measures from Basel I regulation 
and now days they use mostly IRB approach. On some parts of portfolio they use Ba-
sel II standardised approach. Government portfolios, Sampo Banks risks and Northern 
Ireland’s and Ireland’s retail portfolios are calculated by using standardised approach. 
(Laukka, M. 28 Aug 2012.) 
 
The credit exposures of the Group broken by the industry are presented in the At-
tachment 8. It also shows the division between the IRB and standardise approach used. 
It shows that credit exposures calculated by using IRB approach accounts for 78.4% of 
total credit exposures. In cases of central and local governments credit exposures is 
used only the standardised approach. (Danske Bank 2012a, 136-137.) 
 
The reason to use standardised approach is that they do not have enough loss data on 
government counterparties so they could have developed sufficient internal models. 
Also their subsidiary Sampo Bank uses standardised approach. The IRB approach re-
quires the permission from Financial Supervisory Authority. The reason why they do 
not have the permission yet is that the whole data and model structure changed when 
Danske Bank bought Sampo Bank. Thus they were partly missing the data history for 
some new credit risk models and have to build the history before applying for the 
permission. (Laukka, M. 28 Aug 2012.) 
 
The Group is managing its risk-weighted assets effectively. They monthly report the 
situation to the senior management, including short term forecast. The ICAAP process 
is their most important long term tool where they stress test the different level assets 
and liabilities of the Group. They also take into account the capital adequacy effects on 
the development process of the model changes and the new products. Risk-weighted 
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assets are one important factor on the pricing process and thus they try to ensure the 
sufficient returns on equity while the requirements are increasing. (Laukka, M. 28 Aug 
2012.) 
 
The Group can be greatly exposed to the changes in credit risks that occur from the 
changes in macro economy. The Group ensures with several actions that they are able 
to keep their high liquidity position despite of these changes. Impacts to liquidity come 
through sufficient capital buffer. By ensuring the sufficient capital buffer the Group 
ensures that confidence to institution is high. Thus they can get the funding from the 
market with reasonable price to ensure the liquidity. (Laukka, M. 28 Aug 2012.) 
 
The overall capital need is assessed on the basis of internal models. By using the model 
the Group ensures the proper risk management systems. The ICAAP also includes 
capital planning to ensure that the Group always has sufficient capital to support its 
chosen business strategy. Stress testing is important tool for this object. (Danske Bank 
2012a, 21.) 
 
8.4.3 The future regulation 
The group has prepared to the future regulations CRD IV/Basel III with several ac-
tions. They follow closely the development of regulation and constantly calculating the 
impact analysis. They actively participate to the development process by giving com-
ments when European Banking Authority organises workshops. On their operations 
they have taken critical eye on their own product range by analysing the impacts, espe-
cially to proposed liquidity and funding measures. (Laukka, M. 28 Aug 2012.) 
 
The biggest impacts of the regulations to Group come from the new liquidity and 
funding measures. Through these financial claims are increased for some products that 
do not belong to balance sheet. Thus these products might need restructuring and the 
pricing and supply need to be followed. If needed these products have to be changed if 
market prices do not match the funding needs under the new requirements. (Laukka, 
M. 28 Aug 2012.) 
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The impacts of regulation to risk-weighted assets are limited. On the market risk is go-
ing to be some changes. On the big picture the biggest change is the new minimum 
requirements for capital adequacy that react to the economic cycle. Also the quality 
requirements for capital will change. However, the Group’s current capital adequacy 
and capital structure give a good buffer to meet the future requirements. (Laukka, M. 
28 Aug 2012.) 
 
According to Laukka in this market situation there are few things that have to be done 
when starting to implement the new CRD IV regulation. As the implementation pro-
cess is planned it is essential the implement the new regulation in phases. Otherwise it 
would create a risk that lending to the real economy could decline at the point when it 
is essential to boost the economy. The regulation should be also implemented at the 
same time and in a same way in all countries in order to keep the competition in bal-
ance. (Laukka, M. 28 Aug 2012.) 
 
According to Laukka the Danske Group has prepared carefully to future regulation 
and they just have to adapt to product and pricing changes on the market. Laukka does 
not see any significant changes in risk-weights so they do not have any reason to 
change the current risk position of the Group just due to new regulation. The changes 
in regulations are implemented to whole market so there effect that would give com-
petitive advantage to any institution on the market. (Laukka, M. 28 Aug 2012.) 
 
8.5 Deutsche Bank 
After implementing sovereign buffers the Deutsche Bank had 0.77% shortfall to Eu-
ropean Banking Authority’s capital exercise 9% Core Tier 1 ratio target (Attachment 
3). Deutsche Bank has taken certain actions to develop their Core Tier 1 capital base 
and risk-weighted assets. Deutsche Bank has also created Basel III simulation. 
 
8.5.1 Development of capital ratios and risk-weighted assets 
After the end of September 2011 Deutsche Bank has done several actions to increase 
their Core Tier 1 capital and risk-weighted assets to required level by the end of June 
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2012. Also the implementation of revised Basel II framework on fourth quarter 2011 
had quite big impact to the development of ratios. 
 
At the end of September 2011 Core Tier 1 capital totalled for 34.1 billion euros. At the 
end of June 2012 Deutsche Bank had achieved 10.2% Core Tier 1 ratio which totalled 
for 37.8 billion euros (Figure 5). The biggest increase of Core Tier 1 capital was due to 
net income amount of 2.1 billion euros. As a result of implementation of revised Basel 
II framework, the capital deduction items were risk-weighted and resulted the increase 
in capital by 0.9 billion euros. (Deutsche Bank 2012a, 22; Deutsche Bank 2012c, 11.)  
 
 
Figure 5. Development of Core Tier 1 capital (Deutsche Bank 2012c, 10) 
 
At the end of September 2011 risk-weighted assets totalled for 337.6 billion euros. At 
the end of June 2012 Deutsche Bank’s risk-weighted assets totalled for 372.6 billion 
euros. Along the way to the end of June the figures have varied quite a lot due to the 
several actions. On the last quarter of 2011 the revised Basel II framework was imple-
mented. This caused increase of 54.3 billion euros in risk-weighted assets. Compared to 
0.9 billion increase of Core Tier 1 capital this was a lot more. (Deutsche Bank 2012a, 
22.) 
Operational risks increased also by 14 billion euros. Even though the Deutsche Bank 
reduced assets containing credit risks by 22.6 billion euros and assets containing market 
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risks by 6.1 billion euro, the Core Tier 1 ratio decreased significantly to the end of 
fourth quarter. (Deutsche Bank 2012a, 22.) 
 
 
Figure 6. Development of risk-weighted assets (Deutsche Bank 2012c, 10) 
 
In the Figure 6 is presented that on the first quarter of 2012 the Deutsche bank kept 
reducing assets containing market and credit risks totalling amount of 11.5 billion eu-
ros which helped the group increase their capital ratios. (Deutsche Bank 2012d, 25.) 
 
During the first half of 2012 the group managed to achieve the Core Tier 1 capital ratio 
of 10.2%. This was mainly due to the 8.6 billion euros decrease on risk-weighted assets. 
This decrease was mainly driven by decrease from credit risk, which was primarily due 
to portfolio optimisation and model and data enhancements. (Deutsche Bank 2012b, 
23.) 
 
8.5.2 Basel III simulation 
At the end of second quarter the Group created Basel III simulation where they pre-
dict the changes on risk-weighted assets and Core Tier 1 capital. They are committed 
to manage their capital complying with all regulatory thresholds even in stress scenari-
os. The strengthening of Core Tier 1 capital remains a priority of management. 
(Deutsche Bank 2012b, 41.)  
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Deutsche Bank expects to increase of 12 billion euros of risk-weighted assets by the 
end of 2012 due to the normalisation of market risk. Thus they expect their risk-
weighted assets to total for 385 billion euros before implementing Basel III. After im-
plementation of Basel III and management actions the Group predicts that the total 
amount of risk-weighted assets would be approximately 475 billion euros with phase-in 
rules and totalling for 465 billion euros after application of 2019 rules at the beginning 
of 2013. (Deutsche Bank 2012c, 24.) 
 
The group expect 2 billion euros increase in Core Tier 1 capital based on the analyst 
consensus for second half of 2012 collected from Bloomberg. At the end of 2012 the 
Core Tier 1 capital would total for 39 billion euros resulting 10.2% Core Tier 1 ratio. 
The implementation of Basel III phase-in rules would increase this amount by 3 billion 
euros. This would mean 8.9% Core Tier ratio. Application of 2019 rules at the begin-
ning of 2013 would result the 9 billion euros on capital and result of 7.2% Core Tier 1 
ratio. (Deutsche Bank 2012c, 24.) 
 
By the end of first quarter 2013 Deutsche Bank has planned to increase their Basel III 
Core Tier 1 ratio to approximately 10% on a phased in basis which would be equiva-
lent to at least 8% after application of 2019 rules (Deutsche Bank 2012b, 41). 
 
8.6 Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority 
Two analysts of Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority, Peik Granlund and Anton 
Tuomisalo, confirmed that Finnish financial sector is currently on sound basis. The 
market situation is currently quite different in some parts of Europe but the Finnish 
government’s situation is still on sound basis. The government has an effect on banks’ 
capital allocation price and possibilities. The Finnish financial sector is seen in Europe 
one of the soundest sectors in Europe at the moment. It survived successfully from the 
European Banking Authority’s capital exercise and the banks have organised their capi-
tal quite well. (Granlund, P. & Tuomisalo, A. 29 Aug 2012.) 
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8.6.1 Risk-weighted assets 
As mentioned before some banks uses IRB approach and some standardised approach 
on the measurement of risk-weighted assets. In Finland only the big banking groups 
use IRB approach. In Europe also the trend is that standardised approach is more used 
and only big banks use IRB approach. Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority rec-
ommends the use of IRB approach. This is due to fact that from the very beginning 
the Basel regulation has move towards more detailed regulations where institutions 
have chance to develop their own more detailed risk models that go along with the 
regulations. (Granlund, P. & Tuomisalo, A. 29 Aug 2012.) 
 
The IRB approach is an asset to the institution since it provides more accurate results, 
deeper analysis of assets and its more balanced system. The IRB approach also pro-
vides lower risk-weighting requirements for assets which also attracts institutions to 
use this approach. The IRB approach requires thought the approval of the Supervisory 
Authority. In the approval process is looked e.g. the historical data of assets and the 
wideness of the data that the models and parameters are based on. The requirements 
are set in standard that is published by the Supervisory Authority. (Granlund, P. & 
Tuomisalo, A. 29 Aug 2012.) 
 
The Supervisory Authority looks after the models and parameters. The Banks are re-
quired to report very specifically different portfolios. The supervisors make profiles 
about the banks and portfolios and use large scale comparison to similar kind of pro-
files to find the possible misapplication of modelling, parameters and risk-weights. 
Even though the banks have quite a lot freedom to create their own models that corre-
spond to regulation, it would be quite impossible to “tweak” the calculation of assets in 
larger amount. (Granlund, P. & Tuomisalo, A. 29 Aug 2012.) 
 
8.6.2 Basel III & CRD IV regulations 
On the implementation process of new regulations according to Tuomisalo should not 
only consider the capital requirements but also the other parts too. The importance of 
new liquidity frameworks LCR and NSFR should not be forgotten when the banks 
prepare and calculate the impacts of new regulations. The impacts are hard to measure 
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as the differences rises from the structural differences among the countries and even 
the banks on same country. The banks value different assets and thus it is hard to say, 
which assets will get the certain level of impact from the regulations. (Granlund, P. & 
Tuomisalo, A. 29 Aug 2012.) 
 
The second fact is that there is a lot of new regulation in Europe coming in the future. 
This makes it hard to analyse the impacts of single regulation. The impact comes in the 
end from the combination of regulations. The risk-weightings will not have significant 
changes so this will not affect to banks’ risk positions. (Granlund, P. & Tuomisalo, A. 
29 Aug 2012.) 
 
In the end does not matters the impacts of single regulation but how the banks have 
prepared for the future regulations. The trend in Europe seems that banks are quite 
competitive and the confidence to partners is quite low. The banks try to gain the con-
fidence by allocating capital and increasing their capital adequacy. No one wants to be 
the one with the lowest ratios. Also everyone tries to gather great capital buffers on the 
process of preparation to regulations. On this matter European banks are mostly quite 
wealthy and have good capital adequacy situation, so this will not be a problem when 
the implementation of new regulations phase in. (Granlund, P. & Tuomisalo, A. 29 
Aug 2012.) 
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9 Discussion 
The Basel Committee has presented its recommendation for new regulation a while 
ago. European Authorities are trying to restore the confidence by implementing these 
regulations and also at the same time by implementing target capital ratios for Europe-
an banks. This chapter summarises the impacts of new regulation and the preliminary 
results of EBA’s capital exercise. Also the validity of this study is proved. At the end 
will be discussed the possibilities of future research. 
 
9.1 Interpretation of results 
The regulations have developed significantly to direction that allows banks to use more 
detailed approaches on risk measurement. While recovering from the global financial 
crisis the strengthening of capital ratios is one of the key priorities. The banks have to 
increase the quantity, quality and transparency of capital in order to restore the confi-
dence on the banking sector. The market confidence is not completely restored and the 
work continues when the implementation of the newest regulations begins.  
 
Basel III will certainly have impact to capital ratios as the regulation of capital quality 
tightens. It will create capital shortfall. Based on the static balance sheet assumptions 
the impacts of Basel III predict total capital shortfall of 485 billion euros. In the case of 
Deutsche Bank they expect significant increase of RWA and some increase to their 
Core Tier capital. This will be seen also in the future as the decline of capital ratios. 
 
As of 30 June 2012, the 27 banks showed in preliminary report that they have reached 
a recapitalisation amount of 94.4 billion euros. This was a result of the capital plans.  
 
According to the preliminary results 76% of the total recap amount was accomplished 
through the implementation of capital measures that increased eligible own funds. The 
release of capital through the execution of RWA measures amounts for 24%. The in-
crease of core capital was acquired by issuing new ordinary shares, payment of divi-
dends in shares, retained earnings and conversion of hybrids into common capital. 
Disposals of assets had also a positive impact on capital of 8.1 billion euros. Disposals 
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led to a reduction of RWA by 90 billion euros, which is only 1.8% less compared to 
September 2011. 
 
All three case companies either achieved the target ratios or were above the target al-
ready when the recommendation was announced.  
 
The recapitalisation operations of five banks were concluded after the instruments 
subscribed governments were established. Nova KBM had subsequently shown a 
shortfall mainly due to the recognition of further credit risk impairments but is ex-
pected to meet the target by September 2012, if necessary supported by government. 
 
The recommendation has not impacted significantly to lending to the real economy 
and it will remain into force until the transition to the CRD IV. European banks are 
mostly quite wealthy and have good capital adequacy situation, so this will not be a 
problem when the implementation of new regulations begins. 
 
The comparison of Finnish financial markets to rest of Europe shows that banks oper-
ating in Finland are in stable condition and even get advantage of current market situa-
tions. The situation is a quite different in the Southern European countries at the mo-
ment where the banks are in trouble. This has an effect to financial markets also. The 
confidence is not completely restored to European financial markets but the direction 
is right. Despite the market situation Finnish banks seem to stand for high confidence. 
They are well prepared for future regulation and constantly on the up to date.  
 
9.2 Validity of results 
The preliminary results of capital exercise contain high validity. Even though there has 
been a lot of discussion in media about the actions that banks take in order to achieve 
the target the one thing was sure. EBA tried to ensure that the banks did not reach the 
target by “tweaking” their RWA calculations and thus the so called “risk-weighted asset 
optimisation” would not have been possible. 
 
The impacts of single regulation are hard to measure at this situation when there is 
going to be a lot of new regulation at the same time. While reading the impact analysis 
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of Basel III it is good to keep in the mind that the impacts are only due to Basel III, 
not the combination of regulations. The impact analyses are conducted by IMF re-
searchers and bank experts so the studies contain highly reliable information. Of 
course the impacts of Basel III to Deutsche Bank are conducted by the bank itself and 
thus should be looked in with a minor doubt.  
 
All the information in this research is conducted from highly reliable sources that were 
supervisory authorities, organisations, big financial institutions or media representatives 
reporting daily about financial news. Also few financial experts were interviewed.  
 
9.3 Suggestions for future research 
This research contains valuable information about the current changes on the Europe-
an financial markets. The new regulations are going to be implemented and impacts are 
shown in the financial market. At the moment the regulations are concentrating on the 
numerator of the capital ratios and with certain limits to denominator e.g. RWA.  
 
However, in July 2011 the Basel Committee has announced that it will start working on 
RWAs. This is the right next step and the future research concentrate more to devel-
opment of denominators of capital ratios. Especially the developments of risk-
weightings have to be developed.  
 
The trend in regulations is that they are developed to increase the stability of the finan-
cial markets and while trying to avoid the negative impacts to economy. In the discus-
sion with interviewees came up that the new trend of regulations should be that we try 
to develop new regulations that ensure the stability of the markets but also have posi-
tive impacts to the economy. Many of the financial experts have already moved their 
interest towards this interesting aspect. Probably breakthroughs can be expected in the 
near future. This is just the matter of time. 
 
The other possible target of future research is that if the new regulations concentrating 
on the right aspects of the financial markets. European Banking Federation is conduct-
ing a research if EU banking sector’s structure should be reformed. All the regulations 
are now concentrating on the regulating the assets and liabilities of the banking group. 
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This research analyses more the structure of banking sector and if EU banking sector 
should EU possible follow the examples of Vickers Commission in the UK or Volcker 
rule in the USA.  
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Attachments 
Attachment 1. Basel III – Phase-in arrangements 
 
 
(Bank for International Settlements 2011a, 69.) 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
As of 1 
January 
2019
Leverage Ratio
Migration 
to Pillar 1
Minimum Common Equity Capital Ratio 3,5 % 4,0 % 4,5 % 4,5 % 4,5 % 4,5 % 4,5
Capital Conservation Buffer 0,625 % 1,25 % 1,875 % 2,50 %
Minimum common equity plus capital 
conservation buffer
3,5 % 4,0 % 4,5 % 5,125 % 5,75 % 6,375 % 7,0 %
Phase-in of deductions from CET1 
(including amounts exceeding the limit for 
DTAs, MSRs and Financials
20 % 40 % 60 % 80 % 100 % 100 %
Minimum Tier 1 Capital 4,5 % 5,5 % 6,0 % 6,0 % 6,0 % 6,0 % 6,0 %
Minimum Total Capital 8,0 % 8,0 % 8,0 % 8,0 % 8,0 % 8,0 % 8,0 %
Minimum Total Capital plus conservation 
buffer
8,0 % 8,0 % 8,0 % 8,625 % 9,25 % 9,875 % 10,5 %
Capital instruments that no longer qualify 
as non-core Tier 1 capital or Tier 2 capital
Liquidity coverage ratio
Observation 
period begins
Introduce 
minimum 
standard
Net stable funding ratio
Observation 
period begins
Introduce 
minimum 
standard
Shading indicates transition periods - all dates are as of 1 January
Supervisory monitoring
Parallel run 1 Jan 2013 - 1 Jan 2017, Disclosures 
starts 1 Jan 2015
Phased out over 10 year horizon beginning 2013
 65 
Attachment 2. Basel I & II Risk-Weights 
 Basel I Basel II Standardised Approach 
Claims on Sovereigns OECD: 0 % 
Non- OECD: 100 % 
AAA to AA-: 0 % 
A+ to A-: 20% 
BBB+ to BBB-: 50 % 
BB+ to BB-: 100 % 
Below B-: 150% 
Unrated: 100 % 
IMF, BIS, ECB and EC: 0 % 
Claims on Multilateral 
Development Banks 
20% WB, ADB, AfDB, EBRD, IADB, EIF, EIB, 
NIB, CDB, IDB, CEDB: 0 % 
Otherwise based on option 2 for claims on 
banks 
Claims on Banks Short-term 
OECD: 20 % 
Non-OECD: 20 % 
Long-Term 
OECD: 20 % 
Non-OECD: 100 % 
Option 1  
AAA to AA-: 20 % 
A+ to A-: 50% 
BBB+ to B-: 100 % 
Below B-: 150 % 
Unrated: 100 % 
 
Option 2 (Short-term (<3 months) 
AAA to BBB-: 20 % 
BB+ to B-: 50% 
Below B-: 150 % 
Unrated: 20 % 
 
Long-term (>3 months) 
AAA to AA-: 20 % 
A+ to BBB-: 50 % 
BB+ to B-: 100 % 
Below B-: 150 % 
Unrated: 50 % 
Mortgages 50 % for residential 
properties occupied by 
borrower and secured by 
first charge on property 
35 % for residential properties occupied by bor-
rower and secured by first charge on property 
75 % if the loan-to-value ratio exceeds 80 % 
Claims on Corporates 100 % National discretion to weigh all corporate claims 
at 100 % or to use ratings based on: 
AAA to AA-: 20 % 
A+ to A-: 50 % 
BBB+ to BB-: 100 % 
Below BB-: 150 % 
Unrated: 100 % 
For qualifying unsecured retail portfolios: 75 % 
 
(Le Leslé & Avramova 2012, 39.) 
 
 66 
Attachment 3. Composition of capital as of 30 September 2011. 
 
Country 
 
Name 
Shortfall (Million 
EUR) 
before applica-
tion sovereign 
capital buffer 
Shortfall to 9 
% before ap-
plication sov-
ereign capital 
buffer 
Overall Short-
fall (Million 
EUR) 
Overall Short-
fall to 9% 
Overall  
Core Tier 1 % 
Austria Erste Group Bank AG 743 0,60  743 0,60 8,40 
  Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG 2,127 1,96 2,127 1,96 7,04 
  Österreichische Volksbank AG  942 3,52  1,053 3,94 5,06 
Belgium Dexia 1,539 1,23 6,313 5,06 3,94 
  KBC Bank     10,08 
Cyprus Marfin Popular Bank Public Co Ltd 238 0,85 1,971 7,06 1,94 
  Bank Of Cyprus Public Co Ltd 837 3,18 1,560 5,93 3,07 
Germany Deutsche Bank AG 2,851 0,68 3,239 0,77 8,23 
  Commerzbank AG 393 0,15 5,305 2,07 6,93 
  Landesbank Baden-Württemberg     9,11 
  DZ Bank AG Dt. Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank   353 0,36 8,64 
  Bayerische Landesbank     10,00 
  Norddeutsche Landesbank -Gz 2,489 2,99 2,489 2,99 6,01 
  Hypo Real Estate Holding AG, München     18,58 
  WestLB AG, Düsseldorf 224 0,46 224 0,46 8,54 
  HSH Nordbank AG, Hamburg      9,56 
  Landesbank Hessen-Thüringen Gz, Frankfurt 1,473 2,67 1,497 2,72 6,28 
  Landesbank Berlin AG     13,60 
  Dekabank Deutsche Girozentrale, Frankfurt      9,59 
  WGZ Bank AG Westdt. Geno. Zentralbk, Ddf     10,24 
Denmark Danske Bank      13,84 
  Jyske Bank      12,34 
  Sydbank     12,78 
  Nykredit      14,04 
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Spain Banco Santander S.A.  12,878 2,23 15,302 2,66 6,34 
 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S.A.  4,016 1,21 6,329 1,90 7,10 
  BFA Bankia  763 0,39 1,329 0,67 8,23 
  Caja De Ahorros Y Pensiones De Barcelona  272 0,17 630 0,41 8,59 
  Banco Popular Español, S.A.  1,681 1,87 2,581 2,87 6,13 
Finland Op-Pohjola Group      11,11 
France Bnp Paribas    1,476 0,24 8,76 
  Credit AGricole      9,22 
  BPCE  2,750 0,66 3,717 0,90 8,10 
  Societe Generale  2,131 0,58 2,131 0,58 8,42 
United Royal Bank Of Scotland Group Plc      10,54 
Kingdom HSBC Holdings Plc      10,03 
  Barclays Plc      9,76 
  Lloyds Banking Group Plc      10,09 
Hungary Otp Bank Nyrt.      12,37 
Ireland Allied Irish Banks Plc      19,31 
  Bank Of Ireland      12,72 
  Irish Life And Permanent      23,81 
Italy Intesa Sanpaolo S.P.A      9,20 
 Unicredit S.P.A  5,741 1,22 7,974 1,69 7,31 
  Banca Monte Dei Paschi Di Siena S.P.A  - - 3,267 3,02 5,98 
  Banco Popolare - S.C.  2,357 2,53 2,731 2,93 6,07 
  Unione Di Banche Italiane Scpa 526 0,56 1,393 1,49 7,51 
Luxembourg Banque Et Caisse D'epargne De L'etat      13,76 
Malta Bank Of Valletta      10,51 
Netherlands ING Bank NV      9,21 
  RABobank Nederland      12,32 
Netherlands  ABN Amro Bank NV      10,59 
 SNS Bank NV    159 0,81 8,19 
Norway DNB Nor Bank Asa  1,520 1,18 1,520 1,18 7,82 
Poland Powszechna Kasa Oszczędności Bank Polski S.A.     11,16 
Portugal Caixa Geral De Depósitos, Sa  762 0,98 1,834 2,36 6,64 
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 Portugal Banco Comercial Português, Sa   965 1,67 2,130 3,70 5,30 
  Espírito Santo Financial Group, Sa  1,476 2,16 1,597 2,34 6,66 
  Banco BPI, SA  30 0,12 1,389 5,48 3,52 
Sweden Nordea Bank AB      10,87 
  Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB      13,59 
  Svenska Handelsbanken AB      14,74 
  Swedbank AB      13,35 
Slovenia Nova Ljubljanska Banka D.D.  320 2,22 320 2,22 6,78 
  Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor D.D.      9,33 
Note: Overall Core Tier 1 includes existing government support measures but excludes sovereign capital buffer for exposures in EEA. 
 
(European Banking Authority 2011a, 3; European Banking Authority 2011b, 15.) 
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Attachment 4. COREP: Capital Elements of Core Tier 1 
Name of the bank DK008
Million EUR % RWA
A) Common equity before deductions (Orginal own funds without hybrid instruments 
and goverment supportmeasures other than ordinary shares) 14,208
COREP CA 1.1 - hybrid instruments and government support measures 
other than ordinary shares
     Of which: (+) eligible capital and reserves 17,063 COREP CA 1.1.1 + COREP line 1.1.2.1
     Of which: (-) intangibles assets (including goodwill) -3,146 Net amount included in T1 own funds (COREP line 1.1.5.1)
     Of which: (-/+) adjustments to valuation diffrences in other than AFS assets (1) 0 Prudential filters for regulatory capital (COREP line 1.1.2.6.06)
B) Deductions from common equity (Elements deducted from orginal own funds) -554 COREP CA 1.3.T1* (negative amount)
     Of which: (-) deduuctions of participations and subordinated claims
-554
Total of items as defined by Article 57 (l), (m), (n) (o) and (p) of Directive 
2006/48/EC and deducted from original own funds (COREP lines from 
1.3.1 to 1.3.5 included in line 1.3.T1*)
     Of which: (-) securitisation exposures not included in RWA according with CRD3 (2)
0
COREP line 1.3.7 included in line 1.3.T1* (50% securitisation exposures in 
the banking and trading book subject to 1250% risk weight; Art. 57 (r) of 
Directive 2006/48/EC)
     Of which: (-) IRB provision shortfall and IRB equity expected loss amounts (before tax)
0
As defined by Article 57 (q) of Directive 2006/48/EC (COREP line 1.3.8 
included in 1.3.T1*)
C) Common equity (A+B) 13,655 11,02 %
     Of which: ordinary shares subscribed by government 0 Paid up ordinary shares subscribed by government
D) Other Existing government support measures 3,497
E) Core Tier 1 including existing government support measures (C+D)
17,152 13,84 %
Common equity + Existing government support measures included in T1 
other than ordinary shares
Shortfall to 9% before application sovereign capital buffer
0 0,00 %
9%RWA-Core Tier 1 including existing government support measures; if >0.
F) Hybrid instruments not subscribed by government
2,135
Net amount included in T1 own funds (COREP line 1.1.4.1a + COREP 
lines from 1.1.2.2***01 to 1.1.2.2***05 + COREP line 1.1.5.2a (negative 
amount)) not subscribed by government
Tier 1 Capital (E+F) (Total original own funds for general solvency purposes)
19,286 15,56 %
COREP CA 1.4 = COREP CA 1.1 + COREP CA 1.3.T1* (negative 
amount)
RWA as of end September 2011 including add-on for CRD3 123,932
     Of which: RWA add-on for CRD III as of end September 2011 3,507
Sovereign Capital buffer
G) Prudential filter (AFS sovereign assets in EEA as of 30th September 2011) (-/+)
0
Please report the prudential filter as a positive number if the AFS revaluation 
reserve for sovereign assets is negative. Please report the prudetnial filter as a 
negative number if the AFS revaluation reserve is positive. If the bank does not 
apply a prudential filter on AFS sovereign assets, please fill in zero.
H) Difference between the book value and the fair value of sovereign asstes (Bonds and 
loans and advances) in the HTM and Loans Receivables portfolios (3)
-13
Difference between the book value and the fair value at the reference date. 
Please provide a positive number if the book value is larger than the fair value 
of sovereign assets. Please provide a negative number if the book value is 
smaller than the fair value of the sovereign assets.
Sovereign Capital buffer for exposures in EEA (G+H) 0 0,00 % Sum of Prudential filter and valuation. If negative it is set to 0
Overal Shortfall after including sovereign capital buffer 0 0,00 %
9%RWA-(Core Tier 1 including existing government support measures-
Sovereign capital buffer for exposures in EEA); if >0.
(2) According with CRD3 it can include also 50% securitisation exposures in the trading book subject to 1250% risk weight and not included in RWA.
(3) It includes also possible differences between the book value and the fair value of: i) direct sovereign exposures in derivatives; ii) indirect sovereign exposures in the banking and trading book
Composition of capital as of 30 September 2011 (CRD3 rules)
Danske Bank
Notes and definitions
(1) The amount is already included in the computation of the eligible capital and reserves and it is provided separately for information purposes.
References to COREP reporting
September 2011
Capital position CRD 3 Rules
(European Banking Authority 2011c, 1.) 
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Attachment 5. Example calculation of RWA 
Composition of RWA as of 30 September 2011 
 Name of the bank:   Danske Bank 
(in million Euro) 
  
  
Rules at the end of Septem-
ber CRD 3 Rules 
Total RWA 120,425 123,932 
RWA for credit risk 102,482 102,523 
          RWA Securitisation and re-securitisations 4,66 4,701 
          RWA Other credit risk 97,822 97,822 
RWA for market risk 6,115 9,580 
RWA Operational risk 11,829 11,829 
Transitional floors - - 
RWA Other 0 0 
Notes and definitions     
(1) The RWA calculated according to CRD III can be based on models that have not been yet approved by the Na-
tional Supervisory Authority 
(2) All IRB/AMA banks in the exercise have applied transitional floor which assess the impact 80% of the Basel 1 
requirements. However, wide divergences in national approaches to the floors means that two main approaches have 
been identified and as set out in the methodological note. Transitional floors has been applied according to the fol-
lowing approach:      option 2 
(European Banking Authority 2011c, 6.)
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Attachment 6. Interview questions – Danske Bank 
1. How Core Tier 1 capital adequacy and risk-weighted assets are divided among 
the Group? 
2. How the Group manages their risk-weighted assets? 
a. How the management of RWA’s has developed? 
b. What measures have used before IRB approach on credit risk measure-
ment? 
c. Why Group uses also standardised approach on the measurement of cred-
it risks in daughter companies and government bonds? 
3. What are the Group’s targets for capital adequacy? 
a. How you have planned to achieve these targets? 
4. How the Group has prepared for upcoming CRD IV capital adequacy stand-
ards? 
a. What are the biggest impacts of new standards to Group? 
b. How these standards affect to development of RWAs? 
5. What is important for Group when implementing CRD IV under current mar-
ket conditions? 
a. How the future of the Group looks on this sector? 
6. How use of new risk-weights appears on Group’s risk-taking? 
a. Do these changes warrant the Group changes your current risk position? 
i. If yes, how? 
b. Does this have operational impacts to Groups operations / level of com-
petitiveness compared to other similar banking groups? 
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Attachment 7. Interview questions – Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority  
1. What is the situation Finnish banks’ compared to other Europe? 
2. What are the biggest advantages/disadvantages of current market situation to 
Finnish banks? 
3. Why the supervisors recommend the use of IRB approach? 
a. What are the Supervisors’ requirements for use of IRB approach? 
b. What are the advantages of IRB approach compared to standardised ap-
proach? 
c. Which approach is more used in Europe? 
d. How Supervisors follow and control the development of IRB models? 
e. Is there enough control over banks modelling processes? Can banks 
change their risk positions in order to gain Core Tier 1 capital? 
4. How banks should prepare to CRD IV regulation? 
5. What are the biggest impacts of new regulations to banks? 
a. How these affect to the development of RWA? 
6. What are the important factors for banks on the implementation process of 
CRD IV? 
7. How the risk-weights will change? 
a. Can these give banks a reason to change their risk position? 
b. Have these some operational impacts to banks operations or competitive-
ness? 
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Attachment 8. Danske Bank Group’s Credit exposure broke down by industry 
DKK millions IRB Approach Standardised Approach Total Credit exposure IRB % SA % 
Central and local governments  - 115,736 115,736 0,0 % 100,0 % 
Subsidised housing companies 75,379 6,638 82,017 91,9 % 8,1 % 
Banks 63,575 5,992 69,567 91,4 % 8,6 % 
Diversified financials 66,334 4,781 71,115 93,3 % 6,7 % 
Other Financials 33,396 26,114 59,51 56,1 % 43,9 % 
Energy and utilities 35,575 4,842 40,417 88,0 % 12,0 % 
Consumer discretionary and staples 69,889 9,901 79,79 87,6 % 12,4 % 
Commercial property 221,112 23,897 245,009 90,2 % 9,8 % 
Construction, engineering and building 65,605 12,664 78,269 83,8 % 16,2 % 
Transportation and shipping 59,819 3,882 63,701 93,9 % 6,1 % 
Other industrials 161,087 89,622 250,709 64,3 % 35,7 % 
IT 12,972 753 13,725 94,5 % 5,5 % 
Materials 29,863 6,823 36,686 81,4 % 18,6 % 
Health care 21,282 2,943 24,225 87,9 % 12,1 % 
Telecommunication services 2,514 830 3,344 75,2 % 24,8 % 
Personal customers 780,119 151,719 931,838 83,7 % 16,3 % 
Other  16,198 4,188 20,386 79,5 % 20,5 % 
Total 1,714,719 471,325 2,186,044 78,4 % 21,6 % 
 
(Danske Banks 2012a, 136-137.)
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Attachment 9. Overlay matrix 
Research Objectives Theoretical 
Framework 
Measurement 
Tools 
Results 
 
1) The development and impacts 
of Basel regulations 
3, 4, 5 
 
The static balance 
sheet assumptions. 
5.6, 8.4.3, 
8.5.2, 8.6.2 
2) Impact analysis of risk-weighted 
assets 
3.3, 4.2, 6.1, 
7.3 
IMF research, the 
bank’s simulations, 
capital exercise’s 
results 
4.2, 5.1, 8.2.2, 
8.4.2, 8.5.2 
3) The capital position of Europe-
an banks 
7 The results of capi-
tal exercise, Case 
companies, inter-
views 
8, 9 
 
